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Rethinking Damages for Lost Earning
Capacity in a Professional Sports Career:
How to Translate Today’s Athletic Potential
into Tomorrow’s Dollars
Richard T. Karcher
INTRODUCTION
There are many who “want to be like Mike,” but very few
people possess the skills or potential to actually be like Mike. So
how do we know when somebody actually possesses the
extraordinary athletic skill or potential to be able to earn money
in a professional sports career? We know that those who are
currently earning money possess such skill and—assuming they
stay healthy—will probably continue to do so. But how do we
know when somebody has the potential to one day become a
professional athlete?
Suppose for a moment that the real life Michael Jordan was
injured by the tortious conduct of a third party when he was a
senior in high school, leaving him unable to play basketball for
the rest of his life. While the entire world would have missed the
opportunity to witness arguably the best basketball player of all
time, Jordan himself would have missed the opportunity to earn
millions in employment compensation and endorsement income
as a professional athlete.
Now suppose that the injury did not prevent him from
playing basketball for the rest of his life, but kept him from
playing during his freshman year at the University of North
Carolina. Although he may not have lost the chance at a
professional career, that chance may have been diminished. The
challenge would be to determine how much that chance has been
diminished and to quantify that diminished chance in lost future
earnings. Having the luxury of hindsight today, it is easy to say
that when Jordan was a senior in high school and a freshman in
college he had the potential of becoming the best basketball

Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Law and Sports, Florida Coastal
School of Law.

75

Do Not Delete

76

12/12/2010 7:57 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 14:75

player of all time. But having to assess his potential at the time
of the injury prospectively would provide much less certainty.
Though claims involving lost earning capacity damages are
open to the critique of being based on mere “speculation and
conjecture,” there is a level of speculation in any estimate of
damages due to the uncertain nature of the future.1 In lost
earning capacity damages, as in awards for pain and suffering,
the law provides recovery where damages can be proved with
reasonable certainty.2 Courts addressing these issues in the
context of athlete-plaintiffs, for the most part, have failed to
delineate any standards for distinguishing those particular
plaintiffs who possess the requisite level of athletic skill and
potential to be allowed recovery for lost future earnings in a
professional sports career. Implicit in their holdings is what this
Article refers to as a “two-step burden of proof.”3 Step one entails
proving that the defendant’s conduct did in fact cause the
plaintiff’s chance to earn money in the future as an athlete to be
lost or diminished (the factual cause link).4 Step two entails
proving the amount of the lost or diminished chance with
reasonable certainty.5
This Article provides a theoretical and practical perspective
on damages for lost earning capacity in a professional sports
career. Part I addresses how an athlete’s earning potential can
be assessed and the various factors that go into the assessment.
In this context, the Article proposes that earning potential be
considered in terms of a range that defines low, middle, and high
categories of athletic potential. Part II discusses the athlete’s
burden of proof in the form of a two-step process. This part
addresses the complexities of the causation analysis and explains
how the loss-of-chance doctrine and the traditional but-for test
can be applied to establish the factual cause link. This part also
explains how evidence and expert witness testimony can be used
to meet both burdens of proof and satisfy the admissibility
standard under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Part III discusses
the methodology, data compilations, and calculations the author
used as an expert witness to estimate Andy Oliver’s future lost
earnings in his lawsuit against the NCAA.6 This part highlights
See Gorniak v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 889 F.2d 481, 484 (3rd Cir. 1989).
Id.
3 See infra Part II.
4 See infra Part II.A.
5 See infra Part II.B.
6 One week before the scheduled trial, Oliver settled the issue of damages for
$750,000. This Article does not address the merits of Oliver’s underlying claims. The
judgment granting declaratory and permanent injunctive relief is reported at Oliver v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 2009-Ohio-6587, 920 N.E.2d 203, 206
1
2
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the complexities involved in proving lost earning capacity
damages of top draft prospect amateur athletes, but nevertheless
offers a useful roadmap for similar cases.
I. ASSESSING EARNING POTENTIAL
A. What is Lost Earning Capacity?
Victims of tortious conduct are generally entitled to recover
damages for past or prospective loss or impairment of earning
capacity.7 This recovery often arises in connection with personal
injury caused by intentional torts, negligence, and strict
liability.8 However, recovery is not limited to personal injury
actions involving physical harm that prevents the plaintiff from
working as he or she would like. Recovery may also be had
where the defendant’s conduct does not result in physical injury,
but nevertheless impairs the plaintiff’s ability to earn money.
This is evident in cases involving defamation, tortious
interference with an existing or prospective business or business
transaction,
employment
discrimination,
and
wrongful
termination or discharge from employment.9
Lost earning capacity damages compensate the plaintiff for
an impairment of the ability to earn money in the future that
would not exist but for the defendant’s wrongful conduct.10 The
standard measure of damages for lost earning capacity can
therefore be stated in general terms as the difference between
what the plaintiff was capable of earning before the defendant’s
conduct and what the plaintiff is capable of earning thereafter.11
It is the impairment or diminution in the ability to earn money in
the future that is being measured today, not the difference in
actual earnings before and after the impairment causing event.12
(2009). Numerous law review articles have been written about the Oliver case and its
implications. See, e.g., T. Matthew Lockhart, Oliver v. NCAA: Throwing a Contractual
Curveball at the NCAA’s “Veil of Amateurism,” 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 175 (2010); Brandon
D. Morgan, Comment, Oliver v. NCAA: NCAA’s No Agent Rule Called Out, but Remains
Safe, 17 SPORTS LAW. J. 303 (2010); Virginia A. Fitt, Note, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and
the Legal Ease of Redefining Amateurism, 59 DUKE L.J. 555 (2009); James Halt,
Comment, Andy Oliver Strikes Out the NCAA’s “No-Agent” Rule for College Baseball, 19 J.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 185 (2009).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924(b) (1979).
8 JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 6.1 (Gerald W. Boston
ed., 3d ed. 1991).
9 See, e.g., Morales v. Cadena, 825 F.2d 1095, 1100 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming loss of
earning capacity award in employment discrimination case based upon jury’s
consideration of plaintiff ’s emotional turmoil, depression, and career disruption).
10 Gorniak v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 889 F.2d 481, 484 (3rd Cir. 1989).
11 JOHN A. TARANTINO & PATRICIA K. ROCHA, ESTIMATING & PROVING PERSONAL
INJURY DAMAGES §§ 320-21 (Scott Ward ed., James Publishing, Inc. 1996).
12 “Evidence of earnings before and after the injury would be relevant” but “[p]reinjury earnings may understate the actual loss. If future wage increases are to be
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Therefore, although evidence of actual earnings is relevant and
may assist the fact finder in establishing the plaintiff’s earning
ability, recovery for lost earning capacity damages is not
jeopardized if the plaintiff was not gainfully employed at the
time, or even if the plaintiff had no prior history of wages
earned.13 Moreover, lost earning capacity is not necessarily
limited in scope to the power to earn money in the particular line
of work engaged in by the plaintiff at the time of the impairmentcausing event. Indeed, the fact-finder may determine that the
plaintiff was capable of earning more than she was actually
earning at the time of the wrongful conduct and may consider
what the plaintiff was capable of earning in any particular line of
work for which the plaintiff was suited prior to the impairmentcausing event.
If the plaintiff has special knowledge, ability, or skill, the
impairment in earning power is much greater than that of a
person of ordinary knowledge, ability, or skill. In situations in
which the plaintiff is engaged in or pursuing a professional
career that requires extensive education or training, establishing
lost earning capacity damages becomes more problematic in that
the value of a person’s earnings in professional pursuits varies
greatly depending upon the extent of an individual’s exertions.
This certainly applies in the context of professional athletes. As
a result, it is difficult to accurately assess lost earning capacity
based entirely upon what members of the plaintiff’s profession
generally are capable of earning. Relevant and meaningful
factors to consider include the quality and level of the plaintiff’s
performance in the education or training already received and
the initiative or motivation displayed by the plaintiff in pursuing
the career goal to be realized through the education or training.
Lost earning capacity damages should be viewed as
compensating the plaintiff today in an amount that will not be
determined with absolute certainty until some point in the
future. Without a crystal ball, some level of uncertainty is
inherent in any determination of lost earning capacity, including

expected, either because of general increase in industrial productivity or because of the
plaintiff ’s reasonably expected advancement, those increases have also been lost and are
thus recoverable as damages.” DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1048 (2001).
13 See, e.g., O’Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1982) (“If a
man who had never worked in his life graduated from law school, began working at a law
firm at an annual salary of $35,000, and was killed the second day on the job, his lack of a
past wage history would be irrelevant to computing his lost future wages.”). But see
VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 209 (4th ed. 2009)
(“As a practical matter, an actual work history helps a lot in determining the amount a
plaintiff would have been capable of earning but for an injury.”).
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that of an athlete.14 In this respect, lost earning capacity
damages are no different than compensatory damages for future
pain and suffering in personal injury cases. In such cases, the
fact finder determines an amount today that attempts to
accurately reflect unknown future harm (i.e., the level of pain
and suffering the plaintiff will incur), but which is based upon
facts and circumstances known today (i.e., the plaintiff’s age, the
extent of the injury, the medical treatments incurred, etc.).15
Uncertainty in and of itself should not be a concern, provided
there is a sufficient level of confidence in the precise method
being employed to accurately assess the loss.
An accurate assessment of lost earning capacity damages
must consider the plaintiff’s wage-earning potential, which is
based upon existing facts and circumstances, and only a part of
which is evidence of actual earnings.16 For example, a high
school or college student with no history of wages earned may
have significant potential today to earn substantial wages in the
future based upon certain accomplishments, level of education,
and other factors. Conversely, a middle-aged adult with a wellestablished wage history may have already reached his or her
highest earning potential. Thus, in order to accurately assess the
plaintiff’s lost earning capacity today, the fact finder must
determine the plaintiff’s wage-earning potential, taking into
account wage history and other existing facts and circumstances.
Another layer of complexity is added to the assessment of
earning potential where the plaintiff possesses a rare or special
native talent, such as an artist, musician, actor, or athlete.
While there exists a certain level of uncertainty regarding the
earning potential of a person who is engaged in academic study
leading to a career in a typical occupation or profession, there is a
much greater degree of uncertainty as to the earning potential of
one pursuing an artistic or athletic career in which future success
depends not only on training but also primarily on native

14 “The challenge of proving a professional athlete’s lost career earnings is not unlike
that faced by every plaintiff in every tort suit.” Roger I. Abrams, Calculating the Expected
Earnings of a Major League Pitcher, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 193, 194 (2009).
15 “As a broad rule, any competent evidence is admissible which tends to prove the
plaintiff ’s earning capacity, such as evidence of the nature of the injury which has
interfered with that earning capacity, the duration of the injury, and the value of the
earning capacity before and after the injury.” STEIN, supra note 8, at § 6:6.
16 Id. (“The admission of evidence to prove the plaintiff ’s future earning capacity may
include evidence that would fairly indicate present earning capacity and the probability of
its increase or decrease in the future, including evidence of age, intelligence, habits,
health, occupation, life expectancy, ability, probable increase in skill, and rates of wages
paid generally to those following the same vocation, particularly where the injured person
has fitted himself or herself for, but has not yet entered, the work of his or her choice.”).
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talent.17 In recognizing a distinction between persons who
largely exploit native talents and those who exploit intensive
training, the court in Grayson v. Irvmar Realty Corp.18 reduced a
jury award of damages for lost earning capacity to a young
woman studying music toward the development of a career as an
opera singer:
It is notable that those who exploit rare and special talents may
achieve exceedingly high financial rewards, but that the probability of
selection for the great rewards is relatively low. On the other hand,
those who, provided they have the intelligence and opportunities,
train for the more skilled occupations and professions, not so heavily
dependent upon unusual native gifts, will more likely achieve their
objectives.
The would-be operatic singer, or the would-be violin virtuoso, or the
would-be actor, are not assured of achieving their objectives merely
because they have some gifts and complete the customary periods of
training. Their future is a highly speculative one, namely, whether
they will ever receive recognition or the financial perquisites that
result from such recognition. Nevertheless, the opportunities exist
and those opportunities have an economic value which can be
assessed, although, obviously, without any precision. But a jury may
not assume that a young student of the opera who has certain gifts
will earn the income of an operatic singer, even in the median group.19

Although the Grayson court allowed recovery for lost earning
capacity damages, the court significantly reduced the jury’s
award because “except from her teachers, she had not achieved
any spectacular or extraordinary recognition for her talents.”20
B. The Athlete’s Earning Potential Range (EPR)
Spectacular or extraordinary recognition for talent goes
hand-in-hand with earning potential. With regard to athletically
talented individuals with professional prospects and aspirations,
there exists a wide earning potential range, which this article
will refer to as the “EPR.” Lowest on the EPR are unknown high
school athletes who have never earned any compensation for
their athletic ability. Highest on the EPR are well-known, highprofile professional athletes with an established record of
employment earnings or endorsement income. Between these

17 See Grayson v. Irvmar Realty Corp., 184 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959)
(“[I]n the case of persons of rare and special talents many are called but few are chosen.
For those who are not chosen, the probabilities of exploiting their talents financially are
minimal or totally negative. In this class would fall the musical artist, the professional
athlete, and the actor.”).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 36–37.
20 Id. at 37.
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opposite ends of the EPR, there are numerous categories of
athletes who have achieved varying levels of recognition for their
athletic skill and possess varying levels of wage-earning
potential.
For example, toward the lower end of the EPR, there are
amateur athletes, known as “prospects,” who have the potential
to become professional athletes.
However, among these
prospects, there are high-profile college football and basketball
players who have achieved spectacular recognition for their
athletic skills at the most competitive collegiate programs. These
prospects are likely to reach the professional ranks much sooner
than some younger, unknown high-school prospects who may
need more time to mature and develop their skills against better
competition in college or the minor-league farm system.
Moreover, players drafted in early rounds have achieved greater
recognition and are generally considered to be better prospects
than players drafted in later rounds. Thus, a first-round draft
pick typically has greater earning potential—and is therefore
higher on the EPR—than a fifth-round draft pick. Likewise, a
high school athlete who will become eligible to be drafted at a
future date and is currently “projectable” as a first round draft
pick is viewed as a better prospect than a college athlete
projectable as a fifth round pick, and thus has greater earning
potential. The better the prospect, the greater the earning
potential, and the higher the athlete is on the EPR.
Toward the higher end of the EPR are the star veteran
players at the top of the wage scale in their respective sports, as
well as the “journeyman” veteran players making the league
minimum salary. Likewise, Olympic athletes such as Michael
Phelps and Shaun White, who have achieved celebrity status and
have a history of endorsement earnings, would be high on the
EPR.21 The high end of the EPR also includes young professional
players who have performed well early in their careers and who,
though currently making the league minimum salary, will likely
earn a substantial salary that more accurately reflects their
market value in the coming years.
Moreover, there are
professional baseball players at various levels in the minorleague farm system, with players in the Triple-A leagues
generally considered to be closer to advancing to the major league
level than players in the Double-A, Single-A and Rookie leagues.
However, this does not necessarily mean that all players in

21 “[Shaun] White reportedly earns more than $7.5 million a year in endorsements
and prize money.” Tripp Mickle, Whiteout: Action Sports Star Leaves Longtime Agency
IMG and Signs with CAA, SPORTS BUS. J., May 31–June 6, 2010, at 1, 28.
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Triple-A have greater earning potential than those in the leagues
beneath them, because there are players in the Rookie and
Single-A leagues who are considered to be better prospects than
many players at the higher levels, and who therefore have
greater earning potential.
In Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Yeo,22 Yeo, an amateur
Olympic swimmer, claimed that a university’s enforcement of the
NCAA’s ineligibility ruling constituted an unconstitutional
deprivation of protected liberty and property interests. The trial
court recognized the plaintiff’s earning potential based upon the
following uncontradicted evidence produced at trial:
(1) Yeo had already established a world-class reputation and her ‘good
name, outstanding reputation, high standing in her community, her
unblemished integrity and honor are particularly important in the
Republic of Singapore and in light of her cultural background’; (2) if
NCAA rules did not prohibit athletes from accepting professional
compensation while competing in NCAA sanctioned events, Yeo
‘would be immediately eligible to capitalize on her public persona by
entering into lucrative endorsement and marketing opportunities as
well as being eligible for prize winnings due to her performance as a
member of Singapore’s national team’; and (3) ‘UT-Austin represented
to [Yeo] at the time she transferred from [Cal-Berkeley] to become a
student-athlete at UT-Austin that UT Austin would not jeopardize or
compromise [Yeo’s] eligibility to compete on behalf of UT-Austin in
NCAA athletic competition.’ . . . Yeo had competed in two Olympic
games before attending college and had been named sportswoman of
the year and Olympic flag-bearer for her native country, Singapore.
At both the temporary restraining order and permanent injunction
hearings, Yeo represented that it was this continuing interest in her
athletic and professional reputation that UT-Austin had damaged by
its actions.23

Although the Supreme Court of Texas rejected the lower
court’s determination that Yeo’s claimed interest in future
financial opportunities was entitled to due process protection, the
trial court’s discussion regarding Yeo’s earning potential would
be relevant to an assessment of lost earning capacity damages of
an amateur athlete who successfully establishes a legal claim
other than a constitutionally-based claim.24 It appears the trial
171 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2005).
Yeo, 171 S.W.3d at 868.
24 “Yeo’s claimed interest in future financial opportunities is too speculative for due
process protection. There must be an actual legal entitlement.” Id. at 870 (citing Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). But see Hall v. University of
Minnesota, 530 F. Supp. 104 (D.C. Minn. 1982) (holding that a university student and
varsity basketball player, whose applications for admission into a degree program had
been denied, and whose athletic eligibility had been lost as a result, was entitled to a
preliminary injunction because otherwise his overall aspirations regarding a career in
22
23
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court viewed Yeo fairly high on the EPR even though she was an
amateur and had never earned any compensation as a
professional swimmer.
A variety of factors come into play in the assessment of
extraordinary athletic skill and thereby impact an athlete’s
future earning potential. On a macro level, an athlete’s ability to
earn money is based upon his or her value to an employer (i.e., a
team or sporting event)25 and value as an endorser of products
and services.26 This value is generally based upon the athlete’s
performance, reputation, and marketability.27 With regard to a
professional boxer’s earning power, one court essentially found
that earnings fall directly on the heels of winning:
As in most money-making callings, a boxer’s earning capacity is
related to his reputation and his reputation is dependent upon his
success. In the sports world the interested public follows the detailed
records of individual athletes and teams with avidity. It flocks to
watch the athletes with winning records; and the earnings of those
athletes are related directly to the number of paying spectators they
can attract. Spiritually, a professional boxer may emerge greater in
defeat than in victory. Materially, however, his prestige and the
purses he can command are lowered. Any action which affects his
record so prejudicially of necessity impairs economic rights and
interests sufficiently to give the petitioner legal standing to sue.28

An athlete’s potential to earn money in the future is based
upon an assessment of their future capability to achieve success
as an athlete. This is determined by thoroughly evaluating
evidence of past athletic performance, recognition and training
already received, and the amount of training and opportunities
the athlete is likely to receive and realize in the future.29
professional basketball would be substantially threatened, that harm outweighed any
harm that granting the injunction would inflict on other parties, and student
demonstrated a substantial probability of success on his due process claim).
25 See Erik Matuszewski, LeBron James’s Departure Would Cut Value of NBA
Cavaliers
by
$250
Million,
BLOOMBERG
(June
29,
2010,
8:23
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-29/lebron-james-s-departure-may-cut-value-ofnba-s-cavaliers-by-250-million.html (discussing the value of LeBron James to the
Cleveland Cavaliers).
26 See generally Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
27 Id. at 63 (citing, in a right of publicity case, expert witness testimony that “using
athletes and entertainers as endorsers or spokespeople can increase brand awareness and
thereby provide a company a commercial advantage over its competitors, and that it is
‘vitally important’ that the celebrities not have any negative connotation associated with
them so as not to offend any potential consumer”).
28 Tilelli v. Christenberry, 120 N.Y.S.2d 697, 699 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953) (holding that
evidence was not sufficient to sustain Athletic Commissioners’ conclusion that judge had
failed to follow standards set forth in boxing rules in a petition to annul action of
Commissioners, which action had changed the vote cast by a judge in a boxing match).
29 Grayson, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 37 (“In determining, therefore, the amount to be
recovered, the jury may consider the gifts attributed to plaintiff; the training she has
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Further, an athlete’s earning potential must take into account
the athlete’s present physical attributes and skills, as well as an
assessment of what those attributes and skills will look like in
the future.
In their assessment of future athletic ability and
performance, professional scouts look at an athlete’s
individualized native talents, referred to as “tangibles,” as well
as makeup30 and character, referred to as “intangibles.”31
Tangibles consist of things like an athlete’s physical size,
strength, power, speed, and athleticism,32 as well as possession of
sport-specific skills (or “tools”) such as ability to throw, catch, hit,
shoot, field, and so on.33 Intangibles are made up of attitude,
personality, leadership skills, motivation and drive, priorities,
philosophies, intelligence, temperament, ability to handle
pressure situations both on and off the field, performance in
important games, prior incidents of team or league discipline for
misconduct,
criminal
records,
academic
performance,
performance on psychological exams, and virtually anything else
that may positively or negatively impact an athlete’s image.34
received; the training she is likely to receive; the opportunities and the recognition she
already has had; the opportunities she is likely to have in the future; the fact that even
though the opportunities may be many, that the full realization of those opportunities is
limited to the very few; the fact that there are many other risks and contingencies, other
than accidents, which may divert a would-be vocal artist from her career; and, finally,
that it is assessing directly not so much future earning capacity as the opportunities for a
practical chance at such future earning capacity.”).
30 One commenter described makeup as
a mix of discipline, attitude, confidence, seriousness and stage presence that
allows players under the spotlight in a technically difficult sport like baseball
to adjust to tougher and tougher competition. Makeup leads the chosen to the
top. Its absence chops down the insanely talented athletes they’re up against.
Scouts say signing players who have it is a smart way to play the odds.
John W. Miller, Baryshnikov in Baseball Cleats, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2009, 6:14 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052970204683204574356811579058466lMyQjAxMDA5MDEwODExNDgyWj.html (discussing an $800,000 signing bonus paid by
the Minnesota Twins to a sixteen year-old from Berlin whose parents are former Berlin
ballet stars).
31 See infra note 34 (citing references).
32 See Mike Courter, NFL Draft-Hot Prospects for 2009, THE HUDDLE (Apr. 23, 2008),
http://www.thehuddle.com/x8/nfl_draft/mc-hot-2009-prospects.php (noting that Demetrius
Byrd “will be readily mentioned as a first round projection for the 2009 Draft by
combining classic height, weight and speed tangibles . . .”).
33 See Ray Glier, Scouts Scour for Set of Five Tools in Preparation for Draft, USA
TODAY (June 2, 2010, 4:25 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2010-06-02-mlbdraft-five-tool-player_N.htm (noting that a “five-tool player” in baseball means “a hitter
for average and power who has a strong arm, is good with the glove and runs to first base
in at least 4.3 seconds out of the right-handed batter’s box”).
34 Greg A. Bedard, 2010 NFL draft: Quarterback prospects at a glance, MILWAUKEE
WIS. J. SENTINEL (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/sports/packers/90746109.html
(“[Tim Tebow] [m]ay have the best intangibles—leadership, charisma, character,
intelligence, desire—in the entire draft.”);; Blake Hofstad, ESPN Scouts Inc. Intangibles:
What?,
COLLEGE
FOOTBALL
SATURDAY
(Apr.
9,
2010),
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According to Terry Bradway, the New York Jets’ senior personnel
director, character is divided into personal character and football
character—“Football character is in terms of work ethic and
spending time, preparation, study, doing all those extra things
that you want to do to become a player . . . . Then from the
personal standpoint, it’s the off-the-field stuff.”35 Gary Hughes,
special assistant to the general manager of the Chicago Cubs,
said:
A player’s mental makeup can influence his physical skills. Instincts
is a tremendous tool, to say that instincts is not a tool is foolish . . . .
Makeup is a tool, too, but it is tougher to recognize. You see a guy get
upset at a play that goes bad, and you might say, ‘I love that. The guy
is [a] fiery player.’ But the other scout might say, ‘He’s a hothead.’36

An athlete’s tangibles tend to entail more of an objective
assessment influenced by performance statistics, radar guns, and
stop watches.37 An athlete’s intangibles are more subjectively
determined, but they certainly have an impact upon professional
scouts’ evaluations of the athlete, including where the athlete is
ultimately selected in the annual amateur draft.38
http://www.collegefootballsaturday.com/?p=1217 (“Perhaps the most overlooked trait
when evaluating NFL Draft prospects are leadership abilities on and off the field. These
don’t have to do with position, size, speed, or anything else. It’s the difference between
the good prospects and great ones.”). For a discussion of the types of factors that go into a
draft prospect’s intangibles, see Joe LaPointe, Where Athletes Run, Jump and Mull Life as
a Cat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009, at D3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/
sports/football/23combine.html?_r=4&ref=sports (“Along with medical tests and drills to
measure physical skills, the N.F.L. scouting combine allows 32 teams to talk to top
prospects for 15 minutes each. It is like speed dating for draft choices, and the questions
are not always about football.”). ESPN Magazine addressed the impact of intangibles
regarding prospects for the 2010 NFL draft:
[S]couting is often less about projecting and more about digging up dirt. “It’s
not just an evaluation job,” says Falcons GM Thomas Dimitroff. “It’s a
research job.” Every year, there are prospects who’d benefit from a little extra
intel. This year, Oklahoma tight end Jermaine Gresham needs GMs to know
he’s not a loose cannon;; USC defensive end Everson Griffen is battling rumors
he’s inconsistent;; and Michigan cornerback Donovan Warren must reverse a
rep for blowing assignments.
Each prospect is assigned a magnetic card, which details his height, weight,
Wonderlic score, overall grade and position within the team’s system. The card
also features stickers that designate intangibles, coded differently by each
team. The Patriots, for example, use lowercase and capital letters: “C” stands
for circumstance—if, say, a receiver’s stats are down because he played with a
lousy quarterback;; “c” represents a character concern.
Seth Wickersham, You Have Terrible Taste in Prospects, ESPN MAG., Apr. 19, 2010, at 79,
80, 82, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/draft10/news/story?id=5115152.
35 William Rhoden, Shifting Standards for Character, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, at
D2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/17/sports/football/17rhoden.html.
36 Glier, supra note 33.
37 See Courter, supra note 32.
38 See, e.g., NFL Teams Focus on Character as Much as Talent for ‘10 Draft, SPORTS
BUS. DAILY (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/138790. See also
Rhoden, supra note 35 (“A player who is perceived as having good character will move up
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In summary, lost earning capacity damages in cases
involving a plaintiff who possesses extraordinary athletic skill
are based upon an assessment of the plaintiff’s earning potential
as an athlete that exists today. The next section will discuss how
the athlete-plaintiff can prove (1) a causal connection between
the defendant’s actions and a lost or reduced chance or
opportunity to earn money in the future as an athlete, and (2) the
amount of that loss to a reasonable degree of certainty. The EPR
can be helpful to plaintiff and defense counsel, as well as their
expert witnesses, in addressing both burdens of proof.
II. THE ATHLETE’S TWO-STEP BURDEN OF PROOF
Compensatory damages for harm to earning capacity are not
recoverable without proof of pecuniary loss.39 A prerequisite to
recovering for lost earnings or loss of earning capacity is that the
plaintiff must offer evidence establishing “that a significant
amount of earnings has been lost, or that his earning capacity
has been significantly harmed.”40 The plaintiff must establish
“by proof the extent of the harm and the amount of money
representing adequate compensation with as much certainty as
the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit.”41 However,

the draft ladder, and a player perceived as a character risk will move down and lose
millions of dollars.”);; Nate Davis, NFL Draft’s Dust Settled, a Look at Some of the Event’s
Winners and Losers, USA TODAY (Apr. 25, 2010, 1:46 AM), http://content.usatoday.com/
communities/thehuddle/post/2010/04/nfl-draft-dust-settled-a-look-at-some-of-the-eventswinners-and-losers/1 (“[Tim Tebow’s] unquestioned intangibles and determination to
improve his throwing motion did, in fact, ultimately earn him a first-round contract.”);;
Charles Robinson, Fortunes of Tebow, Clausen Unlike Projections, YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr.
24,
2010,
7:49
PM),
http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news;_ylt=AoRw0pqB.
u8oXqJdurBS6Mw5nYcB?slug=cr-draftwinnersandlosers042410 (noting how concerns
about Jimmy Clausen’s leadership abilities and attitude “left him crashing down draft
boards”);; Alex Marvez, Round 1 Shows Character Counts, FOXSPORTS.COM (Apr. 23, 10:45
AM), http://msn.foxsports.com/nfl/story/Tim-Tebow-selection-shows-NFL-places-premiumon-character (“[Dez] Bryant was a top-10 talent who dropped all the way to No. 24 until
picked by Dallas . . . . Bryant’s off-field problems at Oklahoma State overshadowed his
ample physical gifts. Bryant was suspended for almost all of his junior season after lying
to NCAA investigators.
Media reports have painted Bryant as immature and
irresponsible even when it came to something as simple as attending college classes on
time.”);; Associated Press, Cowboys Open Training Camp; Dez Bryant First Player on
Field, USA TODAY (July 24, 2010, 10:02 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
sports/football/nfl/cowboys/2010-07-24-cowboys-training-camp_N.htm?csp=usat.me (“The
Cowboys traded up three spots in April to get Bryant 24th overall after the talented
receiver slipped in the draft amid questions about his character.”);; Nicole Auerbach,
DeMarcus Cousins Aims to Boost Draft Stock, Shed Labels, USA TODAY (June 23, 2010,
10:14 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/2010-06-22-draft-demarcuscousins_N.htm (noting that DeMarcus Cousins “has been pegged as uncoachable—an
immature troublemaker with a bad attitude” and “selecting him in the draft can seem
risky” considering such perceptions).
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 906 (1979).
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. d (1979).
41 § 912.

Do Not Delete

2010]

12/12/2010 7:57 PM

Rethinking Damages For Lost Earning Capacity

87

the desirable level of certainty to be reached in determining
adequate compensation is one of reasonable certainty, not one of
complete or definite certainty.42 Thus, recovery is permissible
even in cases where there is no real equivalence between the
harm and compensation in money (i.e., claims involving
emotional harm) or where the nature of the harm is extremely
difficult to approximate or quantify with a sufficient level of
accuracy (i.e., claims involving lost business profits).43
Comment d to section 912 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts describes a situation in which the defendant has tortiously
interfered with the plaintiff’s entering into or continuing a
business enterprise or business transaction, which entails both
the likelihood of profit and, conversely, a possibility for loss.44 In
order for a plaintiff to recover lost profits, she must prove that
the enterprise or transaction “was or was likely to be profitable
and that the chance of profits has been interfered with.”45 To
illustrate, the Restatement provides an example of a business
transaction in a sports context involving tortious interference
with a contract to promote a boxing match:
A has a contract with B by the terms of which A is to arrange for a
boxing match between B and C. D tortiously causes B to break his
contract before A has incurred any expenses with reference to it. A is
entitled to compensatory damages from D only if he proves that it is
more probable than not that the match would have been made by him
and would have been a financial success, and if his proof offers a
reasonable basis for estimating the profits.46

The above illustration saliently demonstrates the complexity
inherent in proving economic damages for lost future earnings or
lost earning capacity: First, A must prove that D’s wrongful
conduct did in fact cause A a loss of the chance or opportunity to
earn money. Second, A must prove the amount of that loss to a
reasonable degree of certainty.47 There must be a reasonable
probability, not just speculation, that the plaintiff suffered
damages from the defendant’s actions, and there must be
42 § 912, cmt. a. See also Felder v. Physiotherapy Assocs., 158 P.3d 877, 886 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2007) (“As the comment to the Restatement recognized, however, it is desirable
that ‘an injured person not be deprived of substantial compensation merely because he
cannot prove with complete certainty the extent of harm he has suffered.’”) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912, cmt. a (1979)).
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. a (1979).
44 § 912 cmt. d.
45 § 912 cmt. d.
46 § 912 cmt. d, illus. 8.
47 § 912 cmt. a (“It is desirable that responsibility for harm should not be imposed
until it has been proved with reasonable certainty that the harm resulted from the
wrongful conduct of the person charged. It is desirable, also, that there be definiteness of
proof of the amount of damage as far as is reasonably possible.”).
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evidence, not just speculation, that provides a reasonable
estimate of the amount of damages.48 Depending upon where the
plaintiff falls on the EPR, meeting this “two-step burden of
proof ” can be a daunting, possibly even insurmountable task for
plaintiffs seeking lost earning capacity damages.
Any evidence or expert testimony proffered to meet the
athlete-plaintiff’s burdens of proof must satisfy the admissibility
standard under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence:49 “If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise . . . .”50 As the Supreme Court
articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,51
the determination of admissibility requires the judge to make a
two-pronged “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue.”52 In order for the proffered
testimony to meet the first prong—the “scientific knowledge”
prong—the Court in Daubert explained that science “implies a
grounding in the methods and procedures of science” and that
knowledge means something “more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation” and refers to “any body of known facts
or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as
truths on good grounds.”53 “In short, the requirement that an
expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability.”54 The second prong of Rule
702, the “helpfulness” requirement, according to the Court, is
essentially a standard of relevance and, more specifically, a
question of “fit,” because if the proposed scientific evidence does
not bear a “valid scientific connection” to the inquiry of the case,
it will not be helpful to the jury and therefore is not relevant
under Rule 702.55
§ 912 cmt. a.
McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002)
(noting “that ‘[t]he burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert
testimony is on the party offering the expert, and the admissibility must be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence’”) (citing Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300,
1306 (11th Cir. 1999)).
50 FED. R. EVID. 702.
51 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
52 Id. at 592–93.
53 Id. at 590.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 591–94. The Court emphasized that “scientific validity for one purpose is
not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.” Id. at 591.
48
49
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The “gatekeeping” obligation of trial judges under Daubert,
however, extends to all expert testimony, not merely testimony
that is scientific.56 Under Daubert and its progeny, “expert
testimony is admissible if the expert is qualified to testify on the
topic at issue, the testimony will assist the trier of fact, and the
expert’s methodology is sufficiently reliable.”57 A merger of Rule
702’s two-prong test with the two-step burden of proof means
that non-scientific evidence or expert testimony concerning an
athlete’s lost earning capacity damages must (a) be sufficiently
reliable, and (b) assist the trier of fact in (i) making a
determination whether the defendant’s conduct caused a loss or
reduction of the athlete’s chance to earn money in a prospective
professional career, and if so, (ii) making a determination of the
present value of that lost or reduced chance.
A. Step One: Proving that the Defendant’s Conduct in Fact
Caused a Lost or Reduced Chance to Earn Money as an Athlete
1. The Loss of Chance/Opportunity Doctrine
Damages for lost earning capacity essentially compensate
the plaintiff for a loss of chance or opportunity to earn future
profits, and thus lost earning capacity is conceptually analogous
to the loss of chance doctrine. The loss of chance doctrine, also
known as the lost opportunity doctrine, allows a plaintiff to
recover for the impairment (i.e., “loss”) of the plaintiff’s ability
(i.e., “chance” or “opportunity”) to achieve a more favorable
outcome or result because of the defendant’s actions.58 Thus, the
plaintiff’s real injury in a lawsuit seeking damages for lost
earning capacity consists of the diminished chance of achieving a
favorable outcome. The loss of chance doctrine seeks to give the
plaintiff a recovery equal to the extent that the defendant’s
The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific
‘knowledge’ about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact
in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable
grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain
night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was
unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night.
Id.

56 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that the
Daubert factors for assessing reliability apply to nonscientific as well as scientific
reliability).
57 Stewart I. Edelstein, Daubert and Lost-Profits Testimony, 41 TRIAL 31, 31 (2005).
58 For a discussion of the loss of chance doctrine, see Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation,
Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and
Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981) [hereinafter King, Causation]. See also
Joseph H. King, Jr., “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of the
Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491 (1998); Darrell L. Keith, Loss of
Chance: A Modern Proportional Approach to Damages in Texas, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 759
(1992).
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conduct caused a reduction in the chance to profit, which makes
it distinct from a lost profits claim.
The loss of chance doctrine, which is applied often in
personal injury and medical malpractice cases, evolved in
response to the perceived unfairness of the “all or nothing” rule of
tort recovery.59 The all or nothing rule provides that the plaintiff
may only recover if she can prove that the defendant’s conduct
more likely than not caused the unfavorable outcome—if the
plaintiff meets this burden, she recovers one hundred percent of
her damages, but if she does not meet this burden, she recovers
nothing.60 For example, if a patient has a fifty-one percent
chance of survival and a doctor’s negligent failure to diagnose or
properly treat caused that chance to drop to zero, the estate
would be entitled to one hundred percent of the wrongful death
damages, but if a patient has a forty-nine percent chance of
survival and the negligence caused that chance to drop to zero,
the estate receives nothing.61 A fundamental problem with the
all or nothing approach is that it does not accomplish a fair and
adequate allocation of costs and risks in proportion to the extent
of the harm.62 If the plaintiff’s chance of achieving a favorable
outcome before the defendant’s wrongful conduct was less than
fifty percent, it is logically impossible for the plaintiff to show
that the defendant’s conduct was the but for cause of the
diminished chance. The loss of chance doctrine attempts to
alleviate the flaw that is inherent in the all or nothing rule; the
flaw being that it provides a “blanket release from liability”
whenever there is less than a fifty percent chance of achieving a
favorable outcome, irrespective of the flagrancy of the
defendant’s conduct.63 To illustrate the loss of chance doctrine in
monetary terms utilizing a proportional damages method, if the
favorable outcome is $100, and the plaintiff’s chance of obtaining
it was fifty percent before the defendant’s conduct, and that
conduct reduced the plaintiff’s chance to thirty-three percent,
then the loss of chance damages would be $17, which represents
the seventeen percent reduction ($100 multiplied by seventeen
percent).64
See King, Causation, supra note 58, at 1365–66.
Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 829 (Mass. 2008).
Id.
See King, Causation, supra note 58, at 1377 (“By placing [loss of chance] losses
outside tort law, the all-or-nothing approach distorts the loss-assigning role of that law.”).
63 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d, at 829–30.
64 “[T]he proportional damages method is the most appropriate way to quantify the
value of the loss of chance for a more favorable outcome, because it is an easily applied
calculation that fairly ensures that a defendant is not assessed damages for harm that he
did not cause.” Id. at 840. See also Renzi v. Paredes, 890 N.E.2d 806, 813 (Mass. 2008).
But see David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
59
60
61
62
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The landmark British case of Chaplin v. Hicks65 first
recognized loss of chance as an independent recovery of breach of
contract damages. In Chaplin, a contestant in a beauty contest
was awarded damages based on the value of her loss of chance to
actually compete in the contest.66 The contest involved fifty
candidates, from whom twelve would be selected as winners and
who would be awarded professional acting contracts—the
plaintiff was one of the original fifty contestants.67
The
defendant, a theatrical manager, breached a contractual
obligation to notify the plaintiff that she was required to do a
personal interview as a condition to participation in the contest.68
Because the plaintiff did not complete the interview, she was
denied the right to participate in the contest and thus lost the
chance to be selected as one of the twelve winners.69 The court
found it irrelevant that the plaintiff could not possibly prove that
she would have been successful being selected as one of the
twelve contest winners, because the plaintiff’s damage or injury
consisted of the lost opportunity to compete in the contest.70 The
defendant appealed the jury’s award, asserting that it was
unduly speculative and contingent, but the award was affirmed
on appeal.71 The plaintiff’s damages equaled the amount of the
value of the acting contract, discounted based on the plaintiff’s
probability of being selected for a contract; twenty-five percent,
in this case, since the average chance of each competitor winning
was one in four (twelve winners selected out of fifty candidates).72
In essence, Chaplin demonstrates a straight application of the
proportional damages method illustrated earlier, which works in
a case like Chaplin where both the value of the favorable

REV. 605, 631–33 (2001) (arguing that the proportional damages method fails to serve the
basic aims of deterrence because it routinely over or under compensates plaintiffs). Some
courts have rejected the proportional damages method in favor of an approach in which
the fact finder makes a subjective determination of the value of the lost chance without
going through the illusory exercise of setting a value for a more favorable outcome and
then reducing that amount by some percentage. See, e.g., Smith v. State Dept. of Health &
Hosp., 676 So.2d 543 (La. 1996).
65 Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 KB 786.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 787.
68 Id. at 791.
69 Id. at 793.
70 See Snow v. Villacci, 754 A.2d 360, 365 (Me. 2000) (“[T]here is no logical or public
policy reason to deny recovery to a person who has lost an opportunity due to the
negligent acts of another person, as long as the elements necessary for recovery are
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. If a plaintiff has in fact lost a unique
opportunity to increase her earnings, and that loss was caused by defendant’s actions, she
should be able to recover those damages just as she would have if the defendant’s
wrongdoing has caused her to lose wages.”).
71 [1911] 2 KB at 788.
72 Id. at 791.
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outcome (the acting contract) and the reduced chance (twelve out
of fifty) is relatively easy to determine.
To put this in the context of an athlete’s recovery of damages
for lost earning capacity or lost future earnings in a professional
sports career, the athlete’s economic harm is the lost or
diminished chance to earn an amount of money in the future (the
favorable outcome), and the athlete must establish that the
defendant’s wrongful conduct was the factual cause of the
diminished or lost chance.73 For example, in Hall v. University of
Minnesota,74 the district court articulated the economic harm
that would be bestowed upon a college basketball star if he was
wrongly denied application to a degree program, resulting in a
declaration of ineligibility:
According to the evidence, if the plaintiff is accorded the opportunity
to represent the University of Minnesota in intercollegiate varsity
basketball competition during winter quarter of 1982, his senior year,
he will have a significant opportunity to be a second round choice in
the National Basketball Association draft this year, thereby acquiring
a probable guarantee of his first year’s compensation as a player in
the National Basketball Association. If the plaintiff is denied the
opportunity to participate in intercollegiate basketball competition on
behalf of the University of Minnesota during winter quarter 1982, his
chances for a professional career in basketball will be impaired; and it
will be extremely unlikely that his compensation as a first year player
in the National Basketball Association will be guaranteed. The
evidence indicates that without an opportunity to play during the
winter quarter of 1982, the plaintiff would likely be a sixth round
choice in the National Basketball Association draft.75

2. The But For Test
Proving the precise reduction in loss of chance in exact
percentages, in most cases, is nearly impossible to do.
Nevertheless, once breach is established, the plaintiff still must
prove the existence of a factual cause link between the
defendant’s actions and the lost or diminished chance.76 In other
words, it must be shown that the defendant’s conduct is the but
for cause of the loss of chance (i.e., but for the defendant’s
conduct, the likelihood of a favorable outcome would not have
been reduced or destroyed).77 In lost profits claims, the plaintiff
typically must prove that it is more probable than not the
See, e.g., Hall v. Univ. of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982).
Id.
Id. at 106.
See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 2008).
“The proper test in a loss of chance case concerning the conduct of a single
defendant is whether that conduct was the but-for cause of the loss of chance.” Id. at 842.
73
74
75
76
77
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plaintiff would have profited.78 In loss of chance cases, while
some courts have required the plaintiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s actions
caused the diminished chance,79 other courts have held the
plaintiff to a lower burden of proof than the usual preponderance
of evidence standard generally applicable in civil claims.80 For
example, one court held that the plaintiff need merely show that,
but for the defendant’s breach, a “real and substantial chance”
existed that an opportunity or transaction with a third party
would have occurred and led to the plaintiff’s profits; a real and
substantial chance defined as something more than a purely
speculative or fanciful chance.81
As a threshold matter, the underlying cause or causes of
action that establish liability in a particular case may impact the
athlete’s ability to prove a factual causal link between the
defendant’s wrongful conduct and the athlete’s diminished or lost
chance of future earnings. There are two cases decided by the
Arizona Court of Appeals that illustrate this point; one case
involved a college basketball coach’s damages for breach of an
employment contract,82 and the other case involved a personal
injury action brought by a minor league baseball player against a
physical rehabilitation company.83
In the first case, Lindsey v. University of Arizona,84 the
plaintiff, who successfully coached men’s basketball for several
years at Grand Canyon College, applied for and accepted a head
coaching position at the University of Arizona.85 The plaintiff
was terminated by the university after an unsuccessful first
season and filed suit, claiming that the university breached an
oral promise to hire him for four years, despite language in a
letter from the university president that the contract was only for
one year.86 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a jury’s award
of $215,000 for the plaintiff’s lost wages, representing deprivation
78 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. d., illus. 8 (“A is entitled to
compensatory damages from D only if he proves that it is more probable than not that the
match would have been made by him and would have been a financial success. . . .”).
79 See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 832 (“In order to prove loss of chance, a plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the physician’s negligence caused the
plaintiff ’s likelihood of achieving a more favorable outcome to be diminished. That is, the
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the physician’s negligence
caused the plaintiff ’s injury, where the injury consists of the diminished likelihood of
achieving a more favorable medical outcome.”).
80 See, e.g., Allied Maples v. Simmons & Simmons, (1995) 1 W.L.R. 1602 (U.K.).
81 Id. at 1611–14.
82 Lindsey v. Univ. of Ariz., 754 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
83 Felder v. Physiotherapy Assoc., 158 P.3d 877 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
84 Lindsey, 754 P.2d 1152.
85 Id. at 1154.
86 Id. at 1155–56.
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of employment for three years because sufficient evidence was
presented to sustain a finding of breach of contract.87 However,
the Court of Appeals overturned the jury’s award for loss of
future earning capacity in the amount of $480,000, to which the
plaintiff maintained he was entitled because of the difficulty he
would have in obtaining future employment as a coach in view of
his premature termination as coach at Arizona.88 The Lindsey
court concluded that this was akin to reputation damage, which,
according to the court, as a general rule is not recoverable in a
breach of contract action because it “cannot reasonably be
presumed to be within the contemplation of the parties when
they entered into the contract” and the computation of such
damages is “too speculative.”89 In regard to the effect the
plaintiff’s termination would have on his future earning capacity
as a basketball coach, the court found that the jury could “do
nothing more than engage in speculation and conjecture” because
it would depend upon the success or failure of the Arizona
basketball team had the plaintiff continued as head basketball
coach for an additional three years.90
Twenty years later, the same court decided the case of Felder
v. Physiotherapy Associates, in which a minor league AAA
professional baseball player prevailed at trial on a negligence
claim against a physical rehabilitation company relating to a
permanent eye injury he sustained while taking batting practice
at the company’s facility.91 Regarding the issue of lost earning
capacity, which necessarily involved an assessment of the
plaintiff’s chances of making it to the major leagues, the potential
length of his major league career, and the potential range of his
compensation, the jury awarded $7 million and found that the
plaintiff was thirty percent at fault, thus reducing the award to
$4.9 million.92 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial
court erred as a matter of law by failing to find that the evidence
of lost future earnings was “too speculative” and therefore
insufficient to support a claim of lost earning capacity.93 The
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
Lindsey, 754 P.2d at 1158 (“Had Lindsey continued in his employment as the
University of Arizona head basketball coach for an additional three years and sustained
losing seasons similar to the team’s 4-24 overall record for the 1982–83 season, his
coaching career would most likely have been ended and he would have no future earning
capacity as a basketball coach. Had he, on the other hand, coached the team to a national
championship, his future earning capacity may have exceeded the $480,000 award many
times over.”).
91 Felder, 158 P.3d at 877.
92 Id. 884.
93 Id. at 885.
87
88
89
90
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defendant tried to attack the factual cause link between the
defendant’s negligence and a major league career, arguing that
the “fact of damage” is damage to the plaintiff’s major league
career, and thus the plaintiff must first prove that he would have
been promoted to the major leagues.94 But the Court of Appeals
viewed the causation issue in a different light, noting that the
evidence clearly showed that the plaintiff’s professional baseball
career ended as a direct result of the eye injury, and thus the fact
of damage was proven.95 The court found that reaching the
major league level would be an “advancement” in the plaintiff’s
professional career and the eye injury “plainly took away his
chance to continue and advance as a player,” including the
chance of a major league career, thus “the amount of the
damages for being deprived of that chance was for the jury to
decide.”96
The Felder court distinguished Lindsey as involving a
“bright-line rule” whereby a reduction in future earning power or
capacity is not recoverable in an action for breach of an
employment contract, and it concluded that the holding in
Lindsey was not applicable to a personal injury case.97 The court
further noted that proving lost profits in breach of contract cases
is “more complicated” and the line between the fact of damage
and the amount of damage becomes more blurred when lost
profits are at issue.98 According to the Felder court, although
many of the lost profits cases discuss the evidentiary hurdle in
terms of proving the amount of lost profits, the courts are
actually more heavily scrutinizing whether the plaintiff has
presented sufficient proof of the fact of lost profits.99 However,
the Felder court did not explain why the factual cause link in
breach of contract actions involving damages for lost future
earnings or profits requires more skepticism and scrutiny than in
personal injury cases. Certainly, the answer does not lie in the
fact that one is necessarily more “speculative” than the other.
Surely it is just as speculative to suggest that a minor league
baseball player who never played an inning in the major leagues
would have earned substantial compensation in the future at the
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id. at 886–88.
Felder, 158 P.3d at 887 n.6.
98 Id. at 887.
99 Id. See, e.g., Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 680 P.2d 1235, 1247
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming the finding that plaintiff, who sought to recover lost
profits from a commercial catfish farm, had failed to show that he would have been
successful at the business); Coury Bros. Ranches, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 446 P.2d 458, 463–64
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1968) (finding evidence failed to show that breach of contract caused
losses).
94
95
96
97
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major league level as it is to say that a college basketball coach
who was wrongfully terminated would have earned substantial
compensation in the future as a winning coach.
The most plausible justification for the “bright-line rule” in
Lindsey is perhaps the fact that contract remedies seek to
accomplish different goals, incentives, and policies. Contract law
seeks to award an amount that puts the non-breaching party in
the same economic position it would have been had the contract
not been breached—also known as general or expectation
damages.100 Under traditional contract law principles, the most
that the coach in Lindsey could have expected to earn under the
terms of his employment contract, absent the university’s breach,
was his annual compensation pursuant to the terms of the
agreement for as long as the length of the contract term, which is
the amount the coach was awarded by the jury. Indeed, recovery
for lost future earnings or lost profits in a breach of contract case,
known as special or consequential damages, presents a classic
Hadley v. Baxendale101 scenario that demands special proof and a
sufficient level of foreseeability at the time the contract was
entered in order to bring such damages within the contemplation
of the parties.102 The requirement of proof of foreseeability is
evidence of the courts’ hesitance to allow recovery for special
damages when the risk of such losses can sufficiently be allocated
between the contracting parties or by procuring insurance before
the loss is incurred. Tort law, on the other hand, is aimed at
deterrence, compensating the victim and making the injured
party whole, and apportioning liability based on fault. Thus, the
lost earning capacity factual cause link in a case involving
tortious interference with contract does not typically demand the
same level of scrutiny as one that involves breach of contract.
The Lindsey and Felder courts did not discuss the causation
issue in terms of the traditional but for analysis applied in loss of
100 The Lindsey court specifically noted that damages for lost earning capacity
“cannot reasonably be presumed to be within the contemplation of the parties when they
entered into the contract.” Lindsey v. Univ. of Ariz., 754 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1987).
101 Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 L.R.Exch. 341, 355 (holding that damages based on
lost profits were not foreseeable to the defendant common carrier which entered into a
contract with plaintiff grain miller to deliver a broken crankshaft to another party for
repairs by a certain date, and delivery failed to occur on time resulting in lost business for
the plaintiff and a resulting breach of contract claim against the carrier seeking recovery
of lost profits).
102 See, e.g., Susi v. Simonds, 85 A.2d 178, 179 (Me. 1951) (“[F]or the plaintiff to
recover the special damages he claims to have suffered beyond what would naturally flow
from the breach claimed of such contract, it must affirmatively appear that the special
circumstances under which the contract was actually made which gave rise to such
damages were communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant and were thus in the
contemplation of both parties at the time of making the contract.”).
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chance cases.103 However, it seems that the Felder court was
implicitly suggesting that but for the plaintiff’s eye injury (due to
the defendant’s negligence) the plaintiff would not have lost the
chance at a major league career, not that the plaintiff would have
in fact reached the major leagues.104 In other words, it is not
debatable that a permanent eye injury ending the plaintiff’s
ability to play professional baseball at the minor league level also
ended any chance of eventually playing in the major leagues,
which chance existed before the injury, and it was then up to the
jury to assess an amount of his damages for being deprived of
that chance.105 If the plaintiff had been precluded from proving
lost earning capacity damages, he would have fallen victim to the
“all or nothing” rule discussed earlier.106 The “bright-line rule”
for lost earning capacity in breach of contract cases, as in
Lindsey,107 could alternatively be viewed as an application of the
all or nothing rule with an implicit assumption that the plaintiff
should recover nothing because he cannot prove that the
defendant’s breach more likely than not caused an unfavorable
future outcome. Moreover, the inherent unfairness of the all or
nothing rule in tort cases is usually absent in breach of contract
cases essentially for the reasons that justify application of the
bright-line rule in most contract cases.108 However, Chaplin
highlights the exception to the bright-line rule and demonstrates
that there may be contract cases that especially warrant recovery
of damages for lost future earnings.109 The causal link was fairly
compelling in Chaplin because (1) the loss of a chance to compete
in the beauty contest and be one of the twelve finalists who
would receive an acting contract was within the “contemplation
of the parties at the time the contract was entered,”110 and (2) we
can confidently say that, but for the defendant’s failure to notify
the plaintiff about the condition to participating in the beauty
contest, the plaintiff would not have lost the chance (albeit a
twenty-five percent chance) to be one of the twelve finalists and
receive an acting contract.111
Nevertheless, the pertinent question left unanswered in
Felder was the extent of the plaintiff’s chance, before the eye
103 Lindsey v. Univ. of Ariz., 754 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Felder v.
Physiotherapy Assoc., 158 P.3d 877 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
104 Felder, 158 P.3d at 886 (“His injury plainly took away his chance to continue and
advance as a player.”) (emphasis added).
105 Id.
106 See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text.
107 754 P.2d 1152.
108 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
109 Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 KB 786.
110 Id. at 795.
111 Id. at 793.
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injury was inflicted, of earning future compensation in a major
league career—the court determined that the plaintiff lost that
chance without addressing what the plaintiff’s chance was prior
to the eye injury.112 A more precise application of the loss of
chance doctrine, then, would be based on the proportional
damages method applied in Chaplin,113 which would only give the
plaintiff a recovery in an amount that reflected the extent to
which the defendant’s conduct caused a reduction in the chance
of a major league career, which would necessarily require an
assessment of the plaintiff’s chance both before and after the
injury (but which may have been nearly impossible to determine
in Felder). For example, suppose it could be shown that the
plaintiff only had a twenty percent chance of making the major
leagues before the eye injury and, because the injury ended the
plaintiff’s professional career, the injury reduced that chance to
zero. Presumably, then, the plaintiff would only be entitled to
twenty percent of the amount he could expect to have earned in a
future major league career absent the injury. But even if it could
somehow be shown that he had a twenty percent chance, the
amount he could reasonably expect to have earned in a future
major league career would also need to be determined, which of
course would be more uncertain than the known value of one of
the twelve acting contracts to be awarded in the beauty contest.
Determining the reduction in chance is further complicated
when the defendant’s tortious conduct does not result in a
personal injury or death that permanently ends an athlete’s
career, as in Felder, but instead hinders the athlete’s ability to
reach their full athletic potential or to earn an increased level of
compensation as an athlete.114 In these situations, an additional
calculation must be made regarding the plaintiff’s percentage
chance following the injury, which would obviously be some
percentage greater than zero if the injury does not end the
plaintiff’s career (and then the difference between the two would
equal the lost chance in a percentage amount). The proportional
damages method, in which percentages are assigned based on
probabilities, may lend itself well in cases where estimates can
be made based on data obtained and analyzed scientifically and
accepted by the relevant community, such as the use of statistical
survival rates in medical malpractice cases to determine the
Felder v. Physiotherapy Assoc., 158 P.3d 877 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
For a case in which the court determined that the injury did not hinder the
plaintiff ’s ability at all, see Taylor v. Allstate Ins. Co., 205 So. 2d 807, 810–11 (La. Ct. App.
1968) (rejecting plaintiff ’s claims that his performance as an established professional
football player was curtailed as a result of injury to plaintiff ’s back because there was no
evidence in the record which indicates that the injury had any such result).
112
113
114
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chance that a patient would survive a certain medical condition
or treatment.115 However, such percentage determinations are
usually not very conducive to assessing an athlete’s lost earning
capacity in a professional career, which probably explains why
the Felder court did not venture down that path.116 Courts that
impose a lower burden of proof or require less precision for
causation purposes can demand a higher level of scrutiny when
the plaintiff must prove the damage amount with a reasonable
degree of certainty.
The higher the plaintiff is on the EPR, the greater the degree
of confidence with which it can be estimated that the plaintiff did
in fact have a real and substantial chance of future earnings in a
professional career.117 Albrecht v. Industrial Commission118
presents such a case, in which a former professional football
player for the Chicago Bears, whose football career as an
offensive lineman ended after five years when he sustained a
back injury, appealed the Commission’s decision denying him
wage-loss differential workers’ compensation benefits (the
purpose of which is to compensate injured employees for reduced
earning capacity).119 Based on evidence that Albrecht was a firstround draft choice and started every game from his first season
in 1977 up to the time of his injury in 1982, in addition to
evidence that there were offensive linemen in the NFL, and
specifically with the Bears, who played longer than the ten-year
average career length for an NFL offensive lineman, the court
was able to conclude that “but for claimant’s injury, he would
have been in the full performance of his duties as a Bears
offensive lineman after 1983.”120 The court rejected arguments
that Albrecht “cannot prove how long he could have continued

115 See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 833 (Mass. 2008) (“A statistical
survival rate cannot conclusively determine whether a particular patient will survive a
medical condition. But survival rates are not random guesses.”).
116 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., Nolan v. Jefferson Downs, Inc., 592 So.2d 831, 839–40 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(awarding of lost future earning capacity affirmed where jockey won over sixty races in
first year of apprenticeship, retained an agent, was breaking and setting records, was in
the top ten, was the first successful female jockey at Jefferson Downs, had beaten one of
the top jockeys in the country on a fairly regular basis, and was recognized as outstanding
female athlete in Louisiana and named to the Sugar Bowl Hall of Fame).
118 Albrecht v. Indus. Comm’n, 648 N.E.2d 923 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
119 Such an award is based
on the difference between the ‘average amount’ the employee would be able to
earn in the full performance of his duties in the occupation in which he was
engaged at the time of injury and the ‘average amount’ he is earning or is able
to earn in some suitable employment after his injury.
Albrecht, 648 N.E.2d at 925–26 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 495 N.E.2d 68,
73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
120 Albrecht, 648 N.E.2d at 926.
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playing professional football or how much he would have earned
without engaging in speculation” and that “the competitive
nature and physical demands of the sport dictated that [his]
employment as a Bear was of a temporary nature in that it was
dependent on [his] ability to excel over other players competing
for his job.”121 It similarly discounted testimony from the general
manager for the Bears that Albrecht signed contracts year to
year that “were contingent on [his] success in making the football
team” and that “not every player is guaranteed to make the team
on any given year.”122
3. Personal Injury Cases Involving Amateur Athletes
When the athlete is an amateur, the causal connection does
not necessarily become more tenuous, but remains a very fact
intensive inquiry as to whether the plaintiff had a chance at a
professional sports career that was reduced or lost as a result of
the defendant’s actions. Personal injury cases involving athletes
in many respects resemble any bodily injury case in that (1) the
victim is no longer able to perform the type of work he had
performed before the injury, which is typically established
through medical testimony, and (2) if severe enough, the injury is
usually permanent in nature such that the loss of earning
capacity extends for the plaintiff’s entire work life, and the
permanence of the injury is also typically established by medical
testimony to evidence that the plaintiff has reached maximum
recovery.123
Personal injury cases involving athletes also
resemble employment discrimination cases that require the
plaintiff to demonstrate that they are qualified to do the work,124
just as an athlete is required to demonstrate that he is qualified
to earn future compensation as a professional athlete.125 There
are a number of personal injury cases in which amateur athletes,
for the most part college students or graduates, have sought
Id.
Id. (“[W]e may not base our decision solely on the evidence submitted by the Bears
organization since that would require impermissible speculation that claimant’s career
would not have extended beyond 1983 due to the nature of the sport when evidence in the
record indicates otherwise.”).
123 See, e.g., Nolan v. Jefferson Downs, Inc., 592 So.2d 831, 840 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(citing testimony from doctors that jockey could no longer do competitive horse racing
because of eye injury;; one doctor testifying that a fluorescein angiogram of jockey’s eye
indicated “it is more likely than not that over the course of her entire life time that she
will have a progressive decrease in her central vision in the right eye” and that it was
likely the vision in her eye would ultimately decrease to legal blindness).
124 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a)(1) (West 2000) (noting that it does not
constitute employment discrimination to refuse to employ a person with a disability
where that disability prevents the person from performing the essential job functions with
reasonable accommodation).
125 See supra Part II.A.1.
121
122
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recovery of damages for loss of earnings or earning capacity for
having been deprived of the chance for a professional sports
career.
In the cases in which amateur athletes were awarded
recovery, the courts tended to generalize the standard for
meeting the factual cause link, but the causal connection was
nevertheless established in these cases based on a theory that
the plaintiff had previously demonstrated considerable promise
as an amateur athlete. For example, in Horton v. McCrary, the
court affirmed an award of $100,000 to a nineteen-year-old
college baseball player who was involved in a car accident and
incurred a broken leg requiring surgery.126 Damages were
awarded for loss of the opportunity for a professional baseball
career based on expert testimony from a person who had a degree
in physical education with an emphasis on coaching, coached
baseball, taught baseball techniques, played semi-professional
baseball, and observed the plaintiff play college baseball.127 He
opined that the plaintiff would have been drafted to play
professional baseball, that the plaintiff “had better skills than
many of the other college baseball players who became
professionals” and that if the plaintiff “had continued on the pace
that he was going through his freshman year there was no doubt
in . . . [his] mind that Tim would have been picked up by a
professional ball club.”128 The court approved of the trial judge’s
admission into evidence of a scrapbook consisting of newspaper
articles, photographs, and awards documenting the plaintiff’s
athletic accomplishments during high school and college, all of
which tended to show his “desire and fervor for athletics” and
helped to quantify the loss he suffered because of his inability to
continue participation in athletics at the same level he had prior
to the accident.129
In Stafford v. Unsell, the court affirmed a jury’s award of
$35,000 to the plaintiff, an amateur motorcycle racer, who
suffered a broken nose and a broken foot in an auto accident.130
At age fifteen, the plaintiff was one of the top ranked amateur
motorcycle racers in the country, and he anticipated turning
professional at age sixteen and signing a contract with a major
126 Horton v. McCrary, 620 So.2d 918, 930 (La. Ct. App. 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part on other grounds, 635 So.2d 199, 204 (La. 1994).
127 620 So.2d at 929.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 927–28, 931 (“Despite Tim’s attempts to regain his pre-accident physical
condition, the record preponderates that he would not be able to pursue his dream of
playing professional baseball. The testimony of the two expert witnesses . . . clearly show
that Tim had the desire and the ability before the accident to play professional baseball.”).
130 Stafford v. Unsell, 492 So.2d 94 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
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motorcycle manufacturer/sponsor.131 A calcium deposit formed
on the plaintiff’s foot as it was healing, which allegedly caused
severe pain when he engaged in strenuous physical activity and
kept him from properly training as a racer.132 Testimony at trial
indicated that racers must be superbly conditioned athletes,
which causes many to burn out by the age of twenty-four, and the
plaintiff claimed that because the injury prevented him from
maintaining a conditioning program, his racing performance had
been so poor that he was unable to get a contract.133 In answer to
the defendant’s appeal, the plaintiff asserted that his loss of
future earnings was much higher than the jury awarded—in the
neighborhood of $400,000.134 The court disagreed with the
plaintiff and, from a causation standpoint, found that even
though the plaintiff had a chance at a professional racing career,
it was only a slight chance due to facts and circumstances
unrelated to the injury from the accident—for example, the fact
that the “hazards of racing can end a promising career abruptly”
and the fact that the plaintiff had various other physical
ailments that the jury could have reasonably believed
contributed to or solely caused his loss of racing skills.135 In
essence, the court’s holding suggests that it viewed the $35,000
award as reasonably proportionate to the extent to which the
accident diminished the plaintiff’s already slim chance of making
money as a professional racer.
In Washington v. American Community Stores Corp.,136 the
court upheld a jury verdict that the plaintiff, who sought to
recover for back injuries that were undisputedly permanent, had
suffered a permanent impairment of his earning capacity in a
career as a professional wrestler or wrestling coach based on
evidence which showed that he had received numerous accolades
as a wrestler, including college football and wrestling
scholarships, compiled a collegiate wrestling record of 103 wins
and only four losses, won a national varsity wrestling
championship during his sophomore and senior years in college,
and intended to compete in the Olympic trials.137 There was also

Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.
Id.
135 Id. at 98–99 (“The jury also could have reasonably believed that Scooter’s pain was
not as severe or disabling as claimed and that his performance was not significantly
hampered. He only consulted a doctor once over several years in regard to the pain
allegedly caused by the calcium deposit.”).
136 Wash. v. Am. Cmty. Stores Corp., 244 N.W.2d 286 (Neb. 1976).
137 Id. at 288–89. The plaintiff had been employed by the state as an adult parole
officer since his graduation from college, and there was no evidence that he had received
131
132
133
134
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expert testimony that, before his injury, he was a prime
candidate for the U.S. Olympic team and had the qualifications
to become a great international wrestler and win an Olympic
medal, and that those who compete in the Olympics and win a
medal have a much better opportunity to secure employment in
the coaching or professional wrestling fields.138 In conclusive
fashion, the court found “that the evidence strongly supports the
inference . . . that the plaintiff, besides his bodily disability, had
suffered a permanent impairment of his earning capacity in a
professional or coaching career in the wrestling sport.”139
In Clinchfield Rail Road Co. v. Forbes,140 the court affirmed
a $75,000 award to a twenty-five year-old football player who
suffered permanently disabling injuries and held that the trial
judge did not commit error in permitting evidence of a
professional football contract the plaintiff had signed with the
Cleveland Browns on the issue of lost earning capacity.141 The
defendant argued that the contract was not evidence of the
plaintiff’s earning ability because it was contingent on his
making the team and, since there was no evidence that the
plaintiff possessed the necessary skill and ability to play
professional football, the contract had no probative value and
was speculative at best.142 However, the court noted that
evidence had been presented to show that the plaintiff was an
outstanding football player in college, including testimony from
one of his coaches and other witnesses familiar with the game of
football and the plaintiff’s playing ability that they considered
any actual earnings from wrestling at the time of his injury or at the time of the trial. Id.
at 287–88.
138 Id. at 288. The court approved, with some minor reservations, a jury instruction
to the effect that
where a competitor in a sporting or athletic event, because of his superior
ability in that field, has an opportunity of being awarded, with reasonable
certainty or probability, a substantial benefit to him which may be of value to
him in the future, and that he is deprived of this opportunity by another,
through the other’s negligence, then the person so deprived thereof, may
recover such damages which the evidence shows with reasonable certainty that
he has suffered therefrom.
Id. at 290.
139 Id. at 289–90. (“From our quite detailed review of the facts, it is clear that there
was ample evidence to sustain the findings of the jury as to the talents, skill, experience,
training, and industry in the pursuit of the wrestling sport and preparation for
professional occupation and career in this area. The other evidence as to plaintiff ’s age,
life expectancy, health, and habits sustains the presence of all these elements required as
to the proof of loss of earning capacity.”).
140 Clinchfield R.R. Co. v. Forbes, 417 S.W.2d 210 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).
141 The court found that “[t]his contract was exhibited to the jury who were made
aware of the contingency that Forbes did not receive any compensation until he made the
team. It was for the jury to weigh this piece of evidence along with all the other
competent evidence.” Id. at 215.
142 Id. at 214.
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him an outstanding athlete, as well as evidence showing that
many professional football teams were interested in his services
prior to his signing the contract with the Browns.143
Finally, in Connolly v. Pre-Mixed Concrete Co., as a result of
an accident in which considerable muscle tissue in the plaintiff’s
leg was destroyed, the court held that a jury award of $95,000 for
lost earning capacity damages to a twenty year-old woman who
was a champion amateur tennis player with aspirations of
becoming a professional tennis player was not excessive.144 The
plaintiff had “planned to go on a three-months’ professional
tennis tour, for which she had been offered a percentage of the
receipts, with a guarantee of $30,000.”145 In addition, there was
expert testimony that: (1) the plaintiff had not yet reached her
peak, (2) she could have, but for the accident, earned
considerably greater amounts as a professional tennis player,
(3) she would have received additional sums from endorsements
of sporting goods and other articles, (4) her earnings during her
first year as a professional alone would have been at least
$75,000, and (5) she could have expected at least seven or eight
years of participation as a professional.146
In the personal injury cases in which recovery of lost earning
capacity damages was denied, involving amateur athletes
claiming deprivation of a prospective professional sports career,
the factual cause link was found wanting. But here, again, the
Id. at 214–15. The court noted the testimony of two doctors who opined that
he would suffer a permanent disability the remainder of his life . . . [that]
would prevent him from playing football and . . . that if the plaintiff pursued a
football coaching career, his permanent disability would affect his bodily
movements and he would be unable to do the stooping, bending and other
necessary physical movements a coach normally would do in their field.
Id. at 217.
144 Connolly v. Pre-Mixed Concrete Co., 319 P.2d 343 (Cal. 1957).
145 Id. at 346.
146 Id. The witnesses who testified as to the plaintiff ’s earning capacity consisted of
(1) a six-year professional champion who had conducted two professional tours,
(2) somebody who had been connected with tennis for thirty-six years, had been on the
Australian Davis Cup team for a number of years and was a writer on tennis for a
newspaper, and (3) the sports director for a broadcasting system who had been a
professional athlete and was familiar with the earning capacity of champion tennis
players. Id. According to the court, these witnesses “had extensive knowledge of
professional tennis, and their opinions were based on their experience and information
concerning the amounts earned by other tennis players.” Id. See generally Jones v. Iowa
Cent. Cmty. Coll., 972 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1992) (unpublished opinion) (reversing the
district court’s determination that evidence was insufficient to support jury’s award for
loss of future earning capacity on belief that there was no evidence presented that
plaintiff would have regained academic eligibility to play college basketball despite
testimony from an assistant basketball coach at Syracuse University that if plaintiff had
played college basketball for four years (combination of junior and four-year colleges)
without getting hurt he could have played professional basketball in Europe earning
$75,000 per year for ten years).
143
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courts did not provide a definitive standard or explanation
regarding the factual cause link.
For example, in Tanuvasa v. City and County of Honolulu,147
the court held it was prejudicial error for the trial judge to have
given a jury instruction allowing a damages award to a college
student for loss of the opportunity to play professional football,
where (1) the evidence showed that, although the plaintiff had a
brilliant career as a high-school football player, he played football
in college largely as a substitute due to a series of problems
arising in part from injuries he sustained while playing,
(2) expert testimony demonstrated that the plaintiff stood a
chance of playing professional football in the bottom twenty-five
percent of the National Football League (NFL) or in the World or
Canadian Leagues only if he were in shape and motivated, (3) no
evidence was presented indicating that any NFL team that might
have picked the plaintiff in the NFL draft did not do so because
of the injury inflicted by the defendant, and (4) the plaintiff did
not testify specifically that he did not attempt to try out as a free
agent in any professional football league because of the injuries
he incurred in the incident.148 Although the plaintiff stated he
was experiencing frequent headaches, dizziness, and trouble
concentrating, the court found there was no evidence that as a
direct and proximate result of the occurrence in question he was
prevented from pursuing a professional football career.149
Interestingly, the court flatly rejected a claim that, even if the
plaintiff was not actually “prevented” from pursuing such a
career, he lost the chance to try to pursue it.150 Although the
court acknowledged that “there is some evidence that [plaintiff’s]
chances for pursuing a football career were diminished,” the jury
instruction, “as worded, is equally susceptible of the construction
that what was being claimed was the loss of a career.”151
In Emoakemeh v. Southern University, the court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an award of
147 Tanuvasa v. City and County of Honolulu, 626 P.2d 1175 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981).
The plaintiff claimed to suffer headaches, dizziness and blurry vision on a frequent basis,
perhaps every other day, as a result of a beating with a heavy flashlight by a police
officer. Id. at 1178–79.
148 Id. at 1179. According to the court, the only evidence anywhere to be found
establishing a causal connection between the injuries sustained by the plaintiff and his
ability to play professional football was in the cross-examination testimony of a medical
expert retained by the defendants to examine him, who stated that he found no evidence
that the plaintiff had sustained brain damage as a result of the incident and that he had
advised the plaintiff that he had been injured so many times playing football that he
should not attempt to play it anymore. Id. at 1179, 1184.
149 Id. at 1184–85.
150 Id. at 1185.
151 Id.
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damages for lost earning capacity to a Nigerian national who was
on a tennis scholarship and was injured by a gunshot wound to
his thigh during an altercation in a dormitory.152 The plaintiff
“sought to prove that he had the potential to play world class
tennis that would have garnered him a top-notch teaching job at
a prestigious racquet club.”153
One witness who testified
regarding the plaintiff’s potential to play professional tennis, and
who played tennis against the plaintiff once and witnessed the
plaintiff play during sporadic trips to Nigeria, admitted that
questions regarding the plaintiff’s potential as a future tennis
star were very difficult to answer, but that, because of his ability
and the fact that he played in previous ATP tennis tournaments,
one could “deduct that he has the potential of perhaps furthering
his career in the professional field of tennis.”154 However, nobody
who had played tennis with the plaintiff, or had coached him,
testified on his behalf regarding his alleged talent in the sport.155
Further, although the plaintiff had been ranked 826th in the
world when he was sixteen years of age, he was subsequently
stripped of his ranking because he lost in the qualifying rounds of
certain tournaments.156 Therefore, noting that the plaintiff had
the burden of proving loss of future earning capacity with
reasonable certainty, the court found no error in the trial court’s
conclusion that the totality of the evidence regarding the
plaintiff’s tennis abilities was far “too speculative” to support
such an award.157
Lastly, Clement v. Griffin was an action brought by members
of a college baseball team involved in a collision while riding in
the school van.158 The court found no error in the trial judge’s
admission of evidence that one of the plaintiffs had the “dream”
of pursuing a professional baseball career with a restriction that
such evidence could only be used to establish the psychological
impact that the loss of the opportunity to pursue that dream had
on the plaintiff, including mental suffering and loss of enjoyment

Emoakemeh v. S. Univ., 654 So.2d 474 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 479.
Id. at 478. The court noted, however, that “[h]e could not state that the plaintiff
had the potential to be a world class tennis player, but only that the potential ‘was there.’”
Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 479. See generally Weddle v. Phelan, 177 So. 407 (La. Ct. App. 1937)
(holding that, although an injured twenty-two year-old semi-professional baseball player
was awarded damages for loss of expected future employment as such a player, evidence
as to his alleged loss of earnings as a prospective professional baseball player in the major
leagues was too speculative to be considered).
158 Clement v. Griffin, 634 So.2d 412 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
152
153
154
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of life.159 Further, the trial judge instructed the jury that no
evidence had been presented that the plaintiff would have
become a professional baseball player.160
B. Step Two: Proving the Amount of the Loss to a Reasonable
Degree of Certainty
Recall the Restatement’s illustration involving D’s tortious
interference causing B to break his contract with A to promote a
boxing match between B and C.161 The pertinent question
regarding the amount of A’s lost future profits is, what would A
have earned from the promotion of the boxing match absent D’s
tortious interference? It would be impossible to establish with
complete certainty A’s lost profits from a boxing match that A
was unable to promote due to D’s interference. Indeed, because it
involves interference with an intangible right—a business
opportunity or transaction—the amount of the lost profits may be
difficult to prove with any degree of certainty. However, the law
only demands that lost profits be proven with reasonable
certainty, which can be evidenced by books of account, records of
previous transactions, tax returns, or profit history of similar
businesses.162 Similar to proving the value of a tangible item, if
the market value of the business or enterprise interfered with
could be approximated, then the value before and after the loss
could be shown. Alternatively, if market value could not be
approximated, then the income before and after the loss could be
shown.
In cases involving a lost business opportunity, a
reasonable approximation of the value of the loss will often
suffice even if a claim for lost profits would be speculative.163

Id. at 445–46.
Id. at 446. See also Harvey v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 674 So.2d 372, 379 (La.
Ct. App. 1996) (affirming trial court’s award for loss of the opportunity to fully participate
in competitive college football based upon the clear preponderance of the evidence
showing that plaintiff was a highly recruited football player in high school, “was almost
certainly headed towards a collegiate football program,” and trial court’s rejection of lost
earning capacity in a professional career as “remote” and “insufficiently proved to be more
probable than not”).
161 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
162 “Reasonable certainty as to the amount of lost profits can be shown by books of
account, records of previous transactions or tax returns, or the ‘profit history from a
similar business operated by the plaintiff at a different location.’” Felder v. Physiotherapy
Assoc., 158 P.3d 877, 887 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Rancho
Pescado, Inc. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 680 P.2d 1235, 1245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)).
163 See Air Tech. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 199 N.E.2d 538, 548 (Mass. 1964) (citing
Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 KB 786, 791–801 and stating that the “problem is to determine
the value of the opportunity to which AT was entitled as a contract right, even if AT’s lost
profits cannot be ascertained. A reasonable approximation will suffice”). See also Snow v.
Villacci, 754 A.2d 360, 365 (Me. 2000) (acknowledging that recovery of prospective,
hypothetical earnings presented special evidentiary challenges, and holding that a
159
160
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1. The Calculations and Data
The fundamental question in any case in which an athlete is
claiming lost earning capacity in a professional sports career is,
what would the plaintiff have earned as a professional athlete
absent the defendant’s conduct? The answer to that question can
generally be thought of in terms of three basic calculations:
(1) First, calculate an amount that the plaintiff could
reasonably have expected to earn in a prospective
professional career immediately preceding the defendant’s
actions, taking into account not only the plaintiff’s unique
athletic skills and physical and intangible attributes, but
also any risks and contingencies that would otherwise exist
to impact the plaintiff’s ability to earn those dollars in the
future.
(2) Then, calculate an amount that the plaintiff can
reasonably expect to earn in a professional career now as a
result of the defendant’s actions.
(3) Then, subtract the amount in step 2 from the amount in
step 1.
In a case where the diminished chance based on a percentage
can be determined with a reasonable degree of confidence, thus
making the proportional damages method more palatable, step 2
would entail a calculation of the plaintiff’s percentage chance
both before and after the breach and in step 3 the difference in
percentage would be multiplied by the amount calculated in
step 1.
The more established the athlete is as a professional with a
history of earnings, i.e., at the higher end of the EPR, the greater
the degree of certainty with which the athlete’s lost earning
capacity can be determined, because a salary record provides a
benchmark at which to calculate future earnings with more
precision.164 Such an example can be seen in former Miami
Dolphins wide receiver O.J. McDuffie’s recent malpractice
lawsuit against former team physician John Uribe for the
handling of an injury McDuffie incurred to his big toe in the
tenth game of the 1999 season, which ultimately led to the end of

plaintiff may recover damages based on lost earning opportunity if supported by an
adequate evidentiary foundation).
164 See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific
Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 80
(1994) (“[T]he most common starting point for calculating the lost earning capacity of
adults is the plaintiff ’s established earnings record. Current earnings are then used as
the basis for projecting future earnings levels.”).
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his career.165 McDuffie was cut before the 2002 off-season with
three years left on his contract following a successful career in
the NFL.166 In May of 2010, a jury awarded McDuffie $10 million
in lost earnings.167
However, salaries of professional athletes are hardly
stagnant, and there are extreme variances in compensation
among athletes based upon varying levels of individual
performance as well as external factors such as league rules that
artificially restrict a player’s salary for a period of years or allow
a player to earn a salary at market value via free agency or
salary arbitration. As such, the common methodologies used by
forensic economists to determine lost earning capacity in most
occupations are not very conducive to determining an expectable
future earnings stream for an athlete in a professional sports
career.168 In short, there is no single method, measure or formula
that applies uniformly to all cases for calculating lost future
earnings in a professional sports career because athletes are
unique and fall in different places along the EPR. Further, the
extent of the lost opportunity can vary depending upon the
flagrancy of the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury or
damage, thus making the calculation a very fact-intensive

165 See David J. Neal, Former Miami Dolphins’ O.J. McDuffie Gets $11.5 Million,
MIAMI HERALD, May 6, 2010, at 6D, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/
05/06/1615345/former-miami-dolphins-oj-mcduffie.html. McDuffie alleged that Uribe
advised him he could continue to play even though the MRIs showed tendon damage. Id.
166 Id. McDuffie was the Dolphins’ first-round pick out of Penn State in 1993, led the
NFL with ninety receptions for 1,050 yards and seven touchdowns in 1998, and had
career totals of 415 receptions for 5,074 yards and twenty-nine touchdowns, but he had
only forty-three receptions for 516 yards and two touchdowns in 1999 and fourteen
receptions for 143 yards and no touchdowns in 2000. Id.
167 Id.
168 Many economists, for example, measure lost future earnings or earning capacity
based upon an estimate of three joint probabilities—the probability of life, the probability
of labor force participation, and the probability of employment—using published data on
participation rates by age, gender, education, and race, which estimates the joint
probability that the individual will be alive, in the labor market, and actually employed at
any future age. See William Jennings & Penelope Marcurio-Jennings, A Critique of the
Joint Probability of Life, Participation and the Employment Approach, 8 J. LEGAL ECON.
61, 62 (1998). The joint probability estimate at each future age is then multiplied by the
corresponding expected earnings to produce a stream of future expected lost earnings
throughout an individual’s anticipated work life, typically through at least age seventyfive, is then reduced to present value. Id. See also Laura Greenberg, Compensating the
Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals for Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 429, 443–45 (2001) (discussing child-plaintiff cases in which experts
rely on objective factors such as “gender, age, and race-based tables to predict the number
of years that the plaintiff would have remained in the labor force and to determine his or
her expected average wages” as well as subjective data whereby the expert “evaluates the
plaintiff on educational capacity through IQ and aptitude tests, examines the socioeconomic status of the plaintiff ’s family, including the education and work history of the
plaintiff ’s parents and siblings, and analyzes the family’s economic ability to provide
higher education”).
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inquiry.169 The key to any calculation is the reliability of the
evidence upon which it is based, and, to satisfy the admissibility
standard under Rule 702, the evidence must assist the trier of
fact and the expert’s methodology must be sufficiently reliable.170
2. Using Comparable Players: The Appraisal Method
A future earnings assessment of an athlete in a professional
career in some respects resembles an appraisal because a
professional athlete, although legally characterized as an
employee for a professional club, is an asset or an investment
that yields a certain return over time.171 An appraisal of an asset
or a business seeks to determine the fair market value of the
asset or business if it were sold, and there are a variety of
methods that may be utilized.172 Under the sales comparison
approach, an estimate of a property’s fair market value is based
on a comparison of the subject property to similar properties that
were recently sold or that are currently pending for sale.173 The
more accurate the comparables, the more confidence we have
that previous sales and pending purchase agreements reflect the
appraised asset’s fair market value.174 The sales comparison
approach is appealing for its reliance on the market itself, but its
reliability is heavily dependent on the reliability of the available
information in the marketplace.175 The cost approach is based
upon the cost to develop a property comparable to the subject
property as it currently exists, and is premised on the theory that
“[a]ll things being equal, no one will pay more for an existing
property than it would cost to develop a similar property to one’s
169 “No single model is the best method for determining the present value of lost
earnings in all situations.” James E. Ciecka, A Survey of the Structure and Duration of
Time Periods for Lost Earnings Calculations, 4 J. LEGAL ECON. 39, 49 (1994) (discussing
eight different techniques commonly used by forensic economists to estimate lost earnings
focused entirely on the timing and duration of loss periods and not on other aspects of
present value calculations such as discount rates, growth rates for earnings, or age
earnings adjustments).
170 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
171 See Matuszewski, supra note 25 (debating the value of the Cleveland Cavaliers
with and without LeBron James).
172 See generally Alex E. Sadler, Note, The Inherent Ambiguity of Commercial Real
Estate Values, 13 VA. TAX REV. 787 (1994).
173 See id. at 802. See also Leslie Kent Beckhart, Note, No Intrinsic Value: The
Failure of Traditional Real Estate Appraisal Methods to Value Income-Producing
Property, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2251, 2265 (1993) (citing AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL
ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 340 (9th ed. 1987): “The sales
comparison approach assumes that the market value of the subject property is related to
the prices of comparable properties in the same or a similar marketplace.”).
174 Beckhart, supra note 173, at 2265 (“The sales comparison approach is based on
the principle of substitution. This principle states that when several similar or
commensurate commodities, goods, or services are available, consumers will demand the
one with the lowest price and cause it to be distributed most widely.”).
175 See Beckhart, supra note 173, at 2268–69.
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own specifications.”176 Just as there is no single method that
uniformly applies to the calculation of lost earnings in all cases,
there is no single method that applies to the appraisal of
assets.177
Athletes possess unique skills and can be likened to a unique
business for appraisal purposes, in which sales of comparable
businesses are often used to assess value.178 For example, in
affirming the trial court’s determination of the net asset value of
the 1976 New England Patriots for purposes of ascertaining the
fair value of its stock in an appraisal proceeding, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in Sarrouf v. New England Patriots
Football Club, Inc.179 highlighted the uniqueness of a professional
sports team from other businesses in that it is “not only a
business venture, but, as the judge pointed out, a sportsman’s
endeavor.”180 According to the court, an owner of a professional
team is a “celebrity” and a “member of an exclusive club” who,
through the use of his wealth and capital, becomes an “armchair
athlete” in the “public spectacle of professional sports.”181 The
business’ uniqueness is further evident in the prices these
extremely wealthy individuals are willing to pay to own an NFL
team outright, which are largely independent of earning
potential.182 As such, the court held that the trial judge was
entitled to use evidence of prices paid for new franchises as a
starting point in his valuation of the net assets of the New
England Patriots Football Club.183 The trial judge also evaluated
several factors that made the club even more valuable, including
evidence that (1) the club enjoyed a monopoly over the entire
New England area, (2) over the previous two years, the club’s
operating revenue rose seventeen percent and its operating
Beckhart, supra note 173, at 2269.
See ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR
DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY ASSET 1–6 (2d ed. 2002) (noting how different valuation
methods require unique information and procedures for various assets).
178 Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 69–70 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (“In fact, the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition recognizes that expert testimony concerning
the licensing fees paid to similarly-situated persons for comparable uses is relevant to
determine the fair market value of a defendant’s unauthorized use of a plaintiff ’s name in
a right of publicity case.”).
179 Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1122 (Mass.
1986).
180 Id. at 1128.
181 Id.
182 Id. (“Most teams are owned outright by extremely wealthy individuals. The value
they place on ownership of an NFL team is discernable in the prices they are willing to
pay, which are largely independent of earning potential.”).
183 Id. (“In 1974, two new NFL franchises were sold in Tampa, Florida, and Seattle,
Washington. The price for the franchises in these new markets was $16,000,000, though
the agreement for payment brought the real cost down to a present value in 1974 of
$12,500,000 for each franchise.”).
176
177
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income rose twenty-five percent, (3) the stadium lease was a
valuable additional asset, and (4) television broadcasts were
profitable to networks and it was reasonable to believe that the
new television contract would enhance team revenues.184
An athlete’s value in professional team sports is essentially
the compensation a team is willing to pay and that the athlete is
willing to accept, for the athlete’s services pursuant to a player
contract, subject to any league rules that would restrict the
ability of a team and player to freely negotiate a wage at market
rates.185 Similar to an appraisal sales comparison approach,
evaluating past and current earnings of comparable players can
assist teams and player agents in determining a player’s fair
market value in the context of contract negotiations or salary
arbitration.186 So, in these respects, the sales comparison method
for determining the value of an asset in an appraisal resembles
the method used to assess an athlete’s value. However, an
appraisal values an asset as if it were being sold today; lost
earning capacity calculations determine an athlete’s value (or
future earnings) over a period of years in the future, increased
for inflation and reduced to present value.
A calculation of future lost earnings of an athlete in a
professional sports career should take into account, to the extent
available and reliable, all of the following data:
(1) The athlete’s established history of professional earnings,
if any;
(2) The average or median earnings of all similarly situated
players;187
(3) The actual earnings of comparable players;188 and
184 Id. (“Among other factors considered by the judge were the concessions contracts,
tax and other local financial incentives, competition from other professional and collegiate
sports, interest and fan support in the community, value of player contracts and the
caliber of the players, and the current record and prospects of the team.”).
185 See, e.g., Matuszewski, supra note 25.
186 But see Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money: The Role of Preference,
Cognitive Bias, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459
(2006) (discussing the potential influence of behavioral tendencies on professional athletes
in contemplation of contract offers).
187 “[S]tatistics concerning the average earnings of persons in the victim’s field might
be used to estimate the quantity of his lifetime earnings potential.” Joseph A. Kuiper,
Note, The Courts, Daubert, and Willingness-To-Pay: The Doubtful Future of Hedonic
Damages Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1197, 1246
(1996). See also Nolan v. Jefferson Downs, Inc., 592 So.2d 831, 840–41 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding that the evidence presented which showed that jockeys average $35,000 to
$65,000 annually if they are up and comers, supported expert’s choice of $35,000 to
represent jockey’s earning capacity in the future as not unreasonable).
188 See Chamallas, supra note 164, at 80 (“When plaintiffs have an established work
history, the process of calculating loss of future earning capacity may be individualized, at
least to the extent that projections are based on the specific occupation in which plaintiff
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(4) The average professional career length of players in the
athlete’s sport or, more specifically, by position within the
sport.189
Because each player is unique, identifying the specific
players who are most similarly situated or comparable to the
plaintiff from whom a calculation of the plaintiff’s lost future
earnings may be based is critical. Any evidence, including expert
testimony, regarding similarly situated or comparable players
and the methodology used to calculate lost future earnings must
of course satisfy Rule 702.190
3. The Evidence and Expert Testimony in Felder v.
Physiotherapy Associates191
The scope of comparable players was a point of contention in
the Felder case.192 The expert testimony proffered at trial to
establish the lost earning capacity of a AAA minor league player
in the Brewers’ organization, who had no record of any earnings
at the major league level, consisted of two experts.193 Al Goldis,
who was the special assistant to the general manager of the New
York Mets and had twenty-seven years experience in drafting,
scouting, and developing players for major league baseball teams,
testified about Felder’s prospects for playing in the major leagues
and the expected length of his career.194 In Goldis’ opinion, not
only would Felder have made it to the major leagues, but he
would have been the type of player expected to hit home runs and
who other teams would pitch around.195 To support his opinion,
Goldis reviewed the Brewers’ pre-draft scouting reports and
minor league coaching reports on Felder.196 He compared Felder
was employed. Economists will look to plaintiff ’s own earnings record as well as the
average earnings in that occupation to determine both the base annual income and the
projected increases in earnings.”).
189 See, e.g., Albrecht v. Indus. Comm’n, 648 N.E.2d 923, 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(considering evidence of the average career length of an NFL offensive lineman in the
determination of future earnings of an NFL offensive lineman for purposes of wage-loss
differential under workers’ compensation statute);; Nolan, 592 So.2d at 840–41
(considering evidence that jockeys can ride into their forties and fifties so long as they are
not injured and keep their weight down); Plaintiff-Appellant Chicago Bears Football
Club’s Reply Brief, Chicago Bears Football Club v. Indust. Comm’n, 726 N.E.2d 223
(1997) (No. 96 L 50719), 1997 WL 33767139 (arguing that player’s “reasonable career
expectancy” was eight years in workers’ compensation case).
190 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
191 For a discussion of the causation issue in Felder, see supra Part II.A.2.
192 Felder v. Physiotherapy Assoc., 158 P.3d 877, 882–83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)
193 Id.
194 Id. at 882.
195 Id.
196 Id. Goldis also noted that “the Brewers had promoted Felder all the way up from
the rookie league to the AAA level, and that his next step would have been the major
leagues.” Id.
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to major league players who hit fifteen home runs or more per
season from 1981–1990 and he testified that Felder had more
power than Frank Thomas, whom Goldis had drafted.197 Based
upon the fact that Thomas had been playing for approximately
seventeen years, “Goldis testified that Felder’s career would have
lasted between twelve and fifteen years.”198
The other expert witness for Felder was player agent Slade
Mead, who provided trial testimony regarding economic damages
and the range of player salaries.199 Mead testified that “he knew
who Felder was even though he was not Felder’s agent, because
as a first-round draft choice, Felder was a ‘very high-profile
baseball player back when . . . he was being drafted and coming
out of [Florida State University].’”200 In support of his calculation
of Felder’s expected future earnings, Mead selected two
“comparable minor league players” who had moved on to the
major leagues: Jeremy Burnitz and Geoff Jenkins.201 Similar to
Felder, Burnitz and Jenkins “were college outfielders, first-round
draft picks, power hitters, and played for the Brewers.”202
However, Burnitz and Jenkins had established themselves as
successful major league players.
Based on these two
comparables, Mead estimated a seven year career for Felder and
calculated his lost earnings to be $27,790,440.203
In addressing what constitutes “reasonable certainty,” the
Arizona Court of Appeals stated that the amount “must be
supported by the best evidence available and the essential
consideration is that ‘the jury must be guided by some rational
standard.’”204 The Court of Appeals further explained:
For damage to a sports career, the evidence reasonably available will
generally be what was presented at trial in this case—qualified expert
testimony concerning the athlete’s prospects, statistics showing past
performance, and comparative data concerning other athletes. We
need not detail all of the evidence concerning Felder’s career. Suffice
it to say that the jury learned in detail about his batting averages,
fielding performances, and injuries between 1992 and 1998. The jury
was provided with evaluations from minor league coaches and
opinions from several experts with major league player development
experience. The jury also heard about the economics of baseball

Felder, 158 P.3d at 882–83.
Id. at 883.
199 Id. at 882.
200 Id. at 883 (quoting the testimony of Slade Mead).
201 Id.
202 Id. “Mead also presented evidence of how Felder’s minor league performance
differed from Burnitz and Jenkins.” Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 887–88 (quoting Short v. Riley, 724 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Ariz. App. 1986)).
197
198
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compensation, including how long a professional’s career might be and
what similar players were being paid.205

According to Professor Roger Abrams, the court’s decision to
uphold the jury’s verdict and damage calculation is “not
surprising” under this “permissive standard” and there was “no
basis in the evidence” for the jury to select a $7 million figure for
Felder’s lost future earnings.206 Abrams further notes that the
record is devoid of any explanation of the basis for Goldis’
estimate,207 that the court’s opinion fails to indicate the precise
data Mead relied upon, and whether there were other
comparable players in addition to Burnitz and Jenkins who, like
Felder, were first round draft choices with college experience.208
Nevertheless, both Goldis and Mead possessed knowledge
and experience beyond that of the average juror and were
certainly qualified to be expert witnesses.209 Further, their
testimony, including the data and methodology they used, should
have relatively easily satisfied both prongs of Rule 702 as their
opinions were derived by reliable methodologies and assisted the
trier of fact in making an assessment of Felder’s lost earning
capacity damages.210 Once the requirements of Rule 702 are
satisfied, it is up to the fact finder to weigh the credibility of the
witnesses’ testimony and the accuracy and reliability of the data

Id. at 888.
Abrams, supra note 14, at 201. In his article, Professor Abrams explains in detail
the data compilation and methodology he used (relying heavily on performance statistics
of existing major league players) in a wrongful death products liability suit against a drug
manufacturer to calculate $35,203,277 in non-discounted lost future earnings of a pitcher
who was previously drafted in the third round and whose entire major league career
consisted of a total of four and two-thirds innings in three relief appearances. Id. at 209–
21.
207 Id. at 200. “Goldis’s affidavit simply concludes that in his judgment Felder would
have made it to the Major Leagues.” Id. at n.35.
208 Id. at 200 n.36. Professor Abrams also notes that “Goldis in his deposition offered
his opinion that Felder would have had a major league career of 10–15 years, significantly
more than the average player career of 7–8 years for someone who has had a full year of
Major League service.” Id.
209 “The function of an expert is to ‘provide testimony on subjects that are beyond the
common sense, experience and education of the average juror.’” Felder, 158 P.3d at 888
(quoting Adams v. Amore, 895 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)).
210 Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (“If the subject on which
the expert intends to testify is one which lay jurors are not inclined to be familiar with, so
the opinion would be helpful to the jury, it is not a valid objection that the expert’s opinion
goes to the ultimate issue for the jury to decide, or that the expert’s opinion invades the
province of the jury. On the other hand, if the subject is one of everyday experience,
where the jurors are competent to decide the issues, then opinion testimony is properly
rejected.”) (quoting Guzman v. Hanson, 988 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) and
noting that the subject about which expert testified—the use of celebrities to endorse or
otherwise gain commercial advantage in the marketplace—is not a subject of everyday
experience with which a lay juror would be inclined to be familiar, and thus it is not a
valid objection that his opinion embraced issues of ultimate fact such as intent).
205
206
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and methods upon which the calculations are based.211 Given
that Mead’s estimate of Felder’s lost future earnings was just
under $28 million, it appears that the jury was skeptical of the
comparables used by Goldis and Mead because it awarded Felder
only one-fourth of that amount ($7 million), and reduced it by
thirty percent to account for Felder’s comparative fault.212
Perhaps the jury believed that a AAA minor league player who
was a former first round draft pick was higher on the EPR than
most minor leaguers, but was also lower on the EPR than the two
established and successful major leaguers being used as
comparables. The jury may also have been persuaded by the
testimony of the defendant’s experts, who both testified that
Felder did not have “a bright future in baseball” and that
“Felder’s chances of making the major leagues were slim.”213
To rebut the testimony of Goldis and Mead regarding
Felder’s baseball career and earnings, defendant’s expert Steve
Phillips compiled data from 1993–2004 of more than four
hundred “outrighted” players who were cut from a team’s major
league forty-man roster, and which evidenced that “only 21.3% of
outrighted players advance to the major leagues and only 3.4% of
outrighted players remained in the major leagues for more than
three years.”214 In other words, because Felder had been
previously outrighted, the defendant chose to compare Felder to
other outrighted players and believed them to be the most
similarly situated players.215 Felder objected to this evidence on
relevance grounds, arguing that it was a “statistical analysis
which talks about odds” and a general manager “does not draft or
refuse to draft a player based on the odds.”216 Felder also argued
211 See, e.g., Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 131 (Ariz. 2000) (“Questions about the
accuracy and reliability of a witness’ factual basis, data, and methods go to the weight
and credibility of the witness’ testimony and are questions of fact . . . . It is the jury’s
function to determine accuracy, weight, or credibility.”);; McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d at 67
(finding it reasonable, in a right of publicity case, for expert “to use the experiences of
other celebrities—both of whose endorsement careers, [the expert] testified, had started
out similarly to [the plaintiff ’s] with local appearances—to form an opinion about [the
plaintiff ’s] potential endorsement opportunities. That his testimony about [their]
experiences was anecdotal and not verified by documentation may affect the weight to be
given [the expert’s] opinion, it does not destroy the reliability of that information as a
source for comparison”).
212 Felder, 158 P.3d at 884.
213 Id. at 883. The defendant’s expert witnesses were Eddie Epstein, who worked for
several teams in major league baseball and had experience evaluating players’
performance by statistical calculation, and Steve Phillips, who was formerly the General
Manager of the New York Mets. Id.
214 Id. at 889.
215 The defendant argued to the trial judge: “We’ve chosen [to] compare him to other
outrighted players. We believe those are similarly situated players. And if you don’t
allow it, you substitute your judgment for the jurors’.” Id.
216 Id.
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that the players were not comparable to Felder because they did
not have the same skill sets, they did not play the same position,
all were not first-round draft picks, and some of them played in
college, some in high school, and some neither.217 The trial court
excluded the outright data comparison, expressing concern that
Felder would not have had a chance to review and analyze the
underlying data supporting the data compilation due to the
timing of the defendant’s motion to admit the evidence shortly
before the trial began.218 Even though the trial court excluded
the data compilation, the trial court permitted Phillips to testify
about “the significance of being dropped from the 40-man roster
and that few outrighted players have ever advanced to the major
leagues.”219
As such, and given that the outright data
comparison included players from different positions and sixtythree percent of the players on the chart were pitchers, the court
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the data compilation.220
However, the trial court’s questioning of the relevance of the
data essentially because it presented the “odds” of an outrighted
player advancing to the major leagues is rather curious. In cases
involving lost earning capacity damages, expert economists
frequently use published data on labor participation rates by age,
gender, education, and race to show the probability or odds that
the plaintiff “will be alive, in the labor market, and actually
employed at any future age.”221 Indeed, all data used as a basis
for an estimate of an athlete’s future earnings, including player
comparables, in essence presents the “odds” that the plaintiff will
eventually have a successful career as a professional athlete.222
Moreover, comparing a minor league baseball player to specific
players who have had successful careers at the major league level
might actually be less reliable in answering that question than
evidence of a percentage chance or odds. The more pertinent
question concerns the reliability of the data; data showing all
outrighted players and the percentage of those players who
advanced to the major leagues, and then the percentage of those
who stayed in the majors longer than three years, is certainly
Id.
Id.
Id. at 889–90.
Id. at 890.
221 See Jennings & Marcurio-Jennings, supra note 168, at 62.
222 Felder, 158 P.3d at 889 (“[W]e have to look at [Felder] as an individual. And the
only way to do that is to compare him to the players that are most similar to him as
opposed to a wide universe of people dropped from the 40-man roster . . . .
[Physiotherapy’s] witness has not done a player by player comparison . . . . I don’t think
we ought to get into the statistics because they’re not meaningful. There’s no way that
the jury can use or interpret those statistics.”).
217
218
219
220

Do Not Delete

118

12/12/2010 7:57 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 14:75

relevant, but the data would be more reliable if it was limited to
outrighted players who shared substantially similar attributes
and skills as Felder (i.e., were outfielders, power hitters, former
first round draft picks, and played the same number of years in
the minor leagues). Nevertheless, these are matters of weight,
not admissibility, and can be fully explored in crossexamination.223
For a comparable player grouping to be reliable, it must not
be too broad or too narrow and the fact finder must feel
comfortable that the plaintiff is in the same “galaxy” as the
comparable players. A very narrow scope of comparable players,
for example the two players chosen by Felder’s experts, does not
give the fact finder much flexibility in formulating an assessment
of damages. Conversely, if the scope of player comparables is too
broad, for example the entire list of players who were outrighted
over an eleven-year period, the fact finder can be left with too
much leeway and nothing more than “a shot in the dark” at the
plaintiff’s lost future earnings.
Lastly, depending on the
particular case, data of individual comparable players may not
even be the best available evidence to support an estimate of lost
future earnings with reasonable certainty, as will be seen in the
discussion of the calculation of Oliver’s damages in the next
section.
If nothing else, Felder demonstrates how vital it is for
experts to be thorough and precise in the specific data being
used, the compilation of that data, and the methodology
employed to calculate an athlete’s lost earning capacity. Further,
to the extent the expert uses and relies on comparable or
similarly situated players to support an estimate of future
earnings, the specific players chosen by the expert can make or
break the jury’s willingness to accept that expert’s estimate. It is
also helpful to a jury if the expert estimates a low and high end
range of future lost earnings with a detailed explanation of how
both ends of the range were calculated, as opposed to providing
one specific lump sum estimate, given that such a very small
percentage of highly talented athletes even end up establishing
careers as elite professional athletes and the wide disparities in
compensation earned by those few individuals.

223 See Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]o the extent
there were things about Greer’s and Bernstein’s experiences that differed from Twist’s
potential experiences or other evidence—like Twist’s actual endorsement deals or the
deals of other hockey players—that tended to discredit Brooks’s testimony, those are
matters of weight that were fully explored on cross-examination.”).
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III. CALCULATING LOST EARNING CAPACITY IN OLIVER V. NCAA
This Section explains the data compilation and methodology
I used to calculate Andy Oliver’s lost earning capacity as a result
of his wrongfully being declared ineligible to play college baseball
for Oklahoma State University (OSU) because he had a lawyer
represent him in negotiations with the professional club that
drafted him out of high school two years earlier. I was retained
as an expert witness to opine at trial on the legality of the no
agent rule, including the legality of its application to Oliver, and
to opine on the lost earning capacity damages incurred by Oliver
as a result of having been declared ineligible to compete.224 The
lawsuit began almost an entire year in advance of the 2009 Major
League Baseball amateur draft for which Oliver would have been
draft-eligible as a junior. The judge held a bench trial six months
prior to the draft, during the week of January 5, 2009, to decide
on both: (1) Oliver’s request for declaratory judgment that the no
agent rule is invalid on its face or that the rule’s application to
Oliver was arbitrary and capricious or a breach of the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing owed to him, and (2) Oliver’s
request for injunctive relief to reinstate his eligibility.
From a lost earnings standpoint, Oliver’s situation is
distinguishable from that of Felder’s in two very important
respects. First, Oliver was a college baseball player without any
professional playing experience whatsoever. Second, Oliver’s
claim involved a diminished opportunity to earn as a professional
whereas Felder’s claim presented a lost opportunity (because his
eye injury prevented him from ever playing again). As was the
case in Felder, the damages analysis did not require an
economist, accountant, or income/wages expert; it required
somebody possessing knowledge about valuing the marketability
of a baseball player for the draft and the factors that go into
scouts’ evaluations of baseball players—just as a valuation or
appraisal of a house does not require an economist or accountant,
but rather somebody with knowledge about determining the
market value of homes and the various tangible and intangible
factors that would affect its marketability if it were sold (i.e.,
location, décor, lots of kids in the neighborhood, swimming pool,
landscaping, etc.). Determining Oliver’s damages was akin to an
asset valuation or appraisal based upon a reasonable estimate of
the market value of the asset if it were sold, and in Oliver’s
situation, if he were drafted.

224 Much of the information in this Part was extracted from the various expert
witness reports prepared and filed in the case, on file with author.
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The two-step burden of proof discussed in Part III presented
the two overarching issues I had to address from a lost future
earnings standpoint: (1) determining whether the suspension in
fact caused a reduction of Oliver’s opportunity to earn money as a
professional baseball player, and, if so, (2) determining the
present value of that reduced chance with reasonable certainty.
A. Proving the Factual Cause Link
Oliver was suspended indefinitely by OSU at the end of his
sophomore season in the spring of 2008 for a violation of the
NCAA’s no agent rule that occurred in 2006 when he was
originally drafted out of high school; he was suspended from
competing in the post-season that year. In October of 2008, OSU
requested reinstatement of Oliver’s eligibility, and in December
the NCAA rendered its reinstatement decision whereby it
suspended him from competition for the entire 2009 baseball
season and charged him with a year of eligibility.225 This “sit a
year/charge a year” penalty meant that Oliver would have had
only one year of eligibility remaining after the 2009 season,
which would have effectively made him what is known as a
“senior sign” for the 2010 draft, thus substantially reducing his
value for that draft because drafted seniors do not have the
leverage that a drafted junior has of being able to go back to
school for his senior year. The suspension of Oliver for an entire
season during his draft-eligible year and the charging of him
with a year of eligibility solely on the basis that his lawyer was
present with members of Oliver’s family at a meeting in 2006
with personnel of the club that drafted him to discuss the
prospects of signing a contract, was unprecedented.226
The NCAA’s reinstatement decision presented an interesting
hypothetical: Assuming that the no agent rule was found to be
invalid and/or invalidly applied to Oliver, what impact, if any,
would a wrongful suspension in which Oliver was and would be
unable to compete cause a reduction in Oliver’s value in the
upcoming draft?227 The hypothetical posed here also presented
See NCAA Eligibility Case Report dated December 3, 2008 (on file with author).
At the time when Oliver’s lawyer had contact with the club that drafted Oliver in
2006, it appears that the NCAA had previously applied its no agent rule to a college
baseball player only one time, and that was five years prior thereto where a player was
only suspended for six regular season games at the beginning of his freshman year. For a
discussion of the NCAA’s application of the no agent rule and how it detrimentally
impacts college baseball players more so than players in other sports that have a draft,
see Richard T. Karcher, The NCAA’s Regulations Related to the Use of Agents in the Sport
of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best Interest of the Amateur Athlete?, 7
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 215 (2005).
227 Oliver needed to be prepared for the possibility that the judge could rule in his
favor on the declaratory action but deny his request for injunctive relief, which would
225
226
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an interesting factual cause issue at the time of trial. At first
glance it may seem counterintuitive to be inquiring about
whether Oliver would lose any value in a draft that had yet to
occur, not knowing where he would be drafted, but it is
essentially no different than determining unknown future pain
and suffering, future medical expenses or future lost wages in a
personal injury case where the injury has already occurred and
liability has been established.
The question at the time of trial was whether and to what
extent Oliver had been and would be damaged as a result of
wrongfully being declared ineligible, which could be determined
based upon an estimation of both (1) where Oliver would have
been drafted absent the wrongful suspension, and (2) the
suspension’s effect on his “draft stock” (i.e., the number of draft
slots affected). Interestingly, the answer to that question is the
same both before and after the draft and does not vary depending
upon where Oliver would ultimately be drafted. In other words,
knowing where Oliver would ultimately be drafted provides little
assistance because, regardless of where he would ultimately be
drafted, the factual dispute is the same—the dispute centers
around where Oliver would have been drafted absent the
suspension and how many slots lower he was drafted because of
the suspension. So even if, at the time of trial, we could
determine the precise round and slot where Oliver would be
drafted and whether he would ultimately sign a professional
contract and for how much, it still would not answer the
questions of whether the suspension diminished his chance of
being drafted higher and how much that diminished chance is
worth.228
In the days, weeks, months, and years leading up to each
annual draft, scouts from all thirty MLB clubs evaluate all of the
draft-eligible prospects throughout the United States, Canada,
and Puerto Rico. As part of that evaluation process, scouts
assess and heavily scrutinize prospective draft candidates’ “tools”
as well as their makeup and character (i.e., “intangibles”).229

require an assessment of his damages for being wrongfully withheld from competition
during his entire draft-eligible junior season.
228 It is worth noting that Oliver was not claiming an interest in a future professional
sports career; he was seeking compensation for the damages incurred from unfairly and
unjustly being declared ineligible. Therefore, any authority for the proposition that an
interest in a future professional career does not rise to the level of a legally protected
right or a constitutionally protected property right is not applicable because Oliver was
not claiming a property interest or a property right subject to constitutional due process
protection.
229 See supra Part I.B. for a discussion of the various factors that determine a player’s
tools and intangibles.
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With so much competition for the few slots at the top of the draft,
scouts look for any reason they can to draft one player over
another, and a player’s intangible values impact those
decisions.230 The better the draft prospect (i.e., the higher the
player is on the EPR), the more important the intangibles
become to the clubs.231 It is true that every player’s draft stock
can be and is affected by any number of future contingencies and
factors, both tangible and intangible, that may or may not occur
(for example, injuries, improvement or diminishment of skills,
good or bad performance, false allegations of criminal activity,
etc.).232 However, those contingencies and factors have no
bearing whatsoever on any damage attributed to being declared
ineligible due to a wrongful suspension. The task was to isolate
the impact of the suspension on Oliver’s draft stock, all other
things being equal. If a suspension of a top draft prospect during
his draft-eligible year in fact causes some harm to a player’s draft
stock, the amount of the harm would certainly vary depending
upon the length of the suspension.
Although Oliver was an amateur college baseball pitcher, as
a top draft prospect he was fairly high on the EPR at the time of
trial. Oliver was drafted out of high school and was heavily
recruited by the top college baseball programs. As a six-foot
three-inch left-handed pitcher who throws consistently in the
low- to mid-ninety miles per hour range, Oliver was undoubtedly
considered a top prospect by professional scouts for the 2009
draft.233 Three weeks before the draft, he was highlighted on

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
Charles Robinson, Social Networking a Potential Trap for Prospects, YAHOO!
SPORTS (April 7, 2010,
3:35 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=crsocialnetworking040709 (“One [professional football] coach said his team has gotten
particularly adept at collecting information from networking sites. The team combs
through pictures, goes through archived ‘comments’ sections, breezes through friend lists
for other potential contacts, and spends untold amounts of time dissecting pages of
information based on the potential draft status of a player.”).
232 See, e.g., Associated Press, Jury Awards $225,000 to Former Michigan Player,
ESPN.COM (Feb. 19, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nfl&id=3920026
(discussing a former Michigan football player and 2005 first round draft pick of the
Indianapolis Colts, Marlin Jackson, who was awarded $225,000 in a lawsuit against a
fellow student who claimed the football player assaulted him with a bottle in 2003;
Jackson claimed that the false accusation hurt his reputation in NFL pre-draft
interviews, and according to his attorney, “the jury award is roughly equivalent to the
difference in income from being picked one or two spots higher in the draft”).
233 Major League Baseball’s 2009 scouting reports summarized Oliver as follows:
Oliver got a lot of attention when he was suspended by the NCAA for being
represented by an agent, then got the suspension overturned in court. He’s
had an up-and-down junior season performance-wise, but scouts love his
fastball-changeup mix. He can crank the heater up to 98 mph and the change
is a plus pitch as well. More than anything, his fastball command is what
makes him so intriguing, and it’s his bread-and-butter, making up for the lack
230
231
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MLB.com as one of the top two left-handed college pitchers
available for selection.234 In his freshman season in 2007, Oliver
had a 6-1 win-loss record and a 5.52 ERA.235 The following
summer he pitched in the prestigious Cape Cod League where he
had a 1.41 ERA and fifty-four strikeouts in forty-five innings and
was named the tenth-best professional prospect in the league by
Baseball America, the most widely-recognized and reputable
amateur baseball publication.236 In his sophomore season in
2008, he was one of the nation’s top college pitchers when he
earned first-team All-Big 12 honors, was named a second-team
All-American by Rivals.com, ranked third in the Big 12 and
sixteenth nationally with a 2.20 ERA, and led Oklahoma State
(and ranked third in the Big 12) with ninety-six strikeouts.237
The following summer he pitched for Team USA and had a 2-0
record with a 0.93 ERA in four starts, recorded twenty-four
strikeouts in 19.1 innings, and helped lead the United States to a
24-0 record and a gold medal at the world championships.238
Baseball America’s college player ranking for the 2009 draft, as
of September 19, 2008, had him ranked eighth out of all college
players.239 Taking into account high school players, it would be
reasonable to assume that, as of that point in time, he would be
ranked fourteenth, fifteenth, or sixteenth among college and high
school draft eligible players combined.
Given all of this evidence, it was reasonable to conclude that
Oliver’s intangibles value would be reduced as a result of being
declared ineligible by the NCAA for violating the no agent rule.
Oliver was suspended from competing in the 2008 college postseason and lost the opportunity to perform for scouts in an
intense, competitive, and high-pressured post-season environment. Scouts were left wondering how he would have compared

of a breaking ball. Lefties who throw that hard and command the ball that
well aren’t common, so he should go quickly on Draft day.
2009 Draft Reports, MLB.COM (Apr. 24, 2009), http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/events/draft/y2009/
reports.jsp?content=oliver.
234 See Jonathan Mayo, Draft Report: Scouting for Southpaws;; Oklahoma State’s
Oliver Taking Long, Winding Road to Pros, MLB.COM (May 13, 2009, 10:00 AM),
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20090513&content_id=4720060&vkey=news_ml
b&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb.
235 Andrew
Oliver
Pitching
Statistics,
THE
BASEBALL
CUBE,
http://www.thebaseballcube.com/pitching/O/Andrew-Oliver.shtml (last visited Sept. 28,
2010).
236 For
information
about
Baseball
America’s
content,
see
http://www.baseballamerica.com/help/about-us/ (last visited July 3, 2010).
237 Player Bio: Andrew Oliver, http://www.okstate.com/sports/m-basebl/mtt/oliver_
andrew00.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2010).
238 Id.
239 Prospects Plus, BASEBALL AMERICA (Sept. 19, 2008), http://prospectsplus.
baseballamerica.com/college/2009/267141.html (subscription required).
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against other players whom they had the opportunity to see
compete in that environment and what exactly Oliver did wrong
such that the NCAA would take the drastic measure of declaring
him ineligible and suspending him in his draft-eligible junior
season. Moreover, associating with sports agents has a negative
connotation and Oliver was disciplined by the national collegiate
sports governing body because of it, and it received national
media attention.240 Such attention causes an athlete’s stock to
drop in the eyes of potential employers.241 An amount that would
compensate Oliver for his reduced intangibles value would reflect
the difference between his 2009 draft status with and without
the reduction.
As far as an evidentiary basis for estimating Oliver’s draft
value, I determined that the use of comparables would not be a
practical or reliable basis for estimating an amateur baseball
player’s draft value. Performance statistics of amateur baseball
players are not very predictive of future performance or success
as a professional and cannot be compared to the performance
statistics of professional players in any meaningful way. Also,
each draft year is different, with a different pool of draft-eligible
players, which includes both high school and college players of all
positions, and some draft years have a much stronger talent pool
than others. Moreover, because baseball has a minor league
system in which drafted players typically spend a few years
developing their skills, clubs do not tend to select players in the
draft based upon current needs on their major league rosters;
they select the next best available player regardless of position.
Thus, attempting to draw any meaningful comparisons between
a top college pitching prospect and players drafted in previous
years or current professional players tends to be an exercise in
futility.
I relied on Baseball America’s most recent rankings of college
and high school baseball prospects for the 2009 draft, which are
based upon the editors’ evaluations of players as well as input
from professional scouts and college coaches. For the purpose of
computing damages in this case, the rankings data served as a
240 Indeed, the attention given to the suspension is the first statement made in the
summary section of Major League Baseball’s scouting report on Oliver. 2009 Draft
Reports, supra note 233.
241 See, e.g., NFL Draft Prospect Andre Smith Fires Alvin Keels as Agent, SPORTS
BUSINESS DAILY (April 14, 2009) (“[Andre] Smith was originally viewed as one of the top
picks in the Draft, but his stock has dropped after he was held out of the Sugar Bowl for
alleged contact with an agent and after he left the NFL Combine early. In early
February, Smith was ranked No. 2 by Web site NFLDraftBlitz.com, but yesterday he was
ranked No. 6 and is not among the nine players who have accepted invitations to the NFL
Draft.”).
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substitute for individual scouting reports on Oliver and was
actually a more reliable source because Baseball America
compiles numerous scouting reports on all of the top prospects
eligible for the draft, and the rankings are a culmination of all of
those scouting reports. The rankings provide the most objective
source for evaluating what is otherwise a highly subjective draft
selection process. Thus, the rankings provide a reasonable basis
and quite possibly “the best evidence available” to estimate
where Oliver would be drafted absent any suspension, assuming
all other things being equal and that Oliver continued to perform
as he had been. In both its September and November rankings,
Baseball America had Oliver projected to be drafted in the middle
of the first round.242
B. Proving the Amount of the Lost Future Earnings with
Reasonable Certainty
1. Lost Signing Bonus
I calculated the damages based upon an estimation that
Oliver’s reduced intangibles value would lower his draft status by
a range of a quarter of a round (approximately seven slots) to
three-quarters of a round (approximately twenty-two slots). I
deemed this to be a conservative estimate, as there are fifty
rounds in the draft. Also, with such a huge pool of draft-eligible
players to choose from, which includes high school seniors and
junior college players, a player’s intangibles are often the key
factor that separates one player from another on a club’s draft
board, especially when it comes to players at the top of the draft
board. Using Baseball America’s ranking of the middle of the
first round as a starting point, which would be the fifteenth slot,
and reducing it by a range of seven to twenty-two slots, Oliver’s
adjusted draft status would place him in the range of the twentysecond slot to the thirty-seventh slot (in the supplemental first
round) for the 2009 draft.
To determine a range of compensation that would
compensate Oliver for his reduced intangibles value in the 2009
draft, I used the signing bonuses from the 2008 draft and
adjusted them by ten percent for inflation. Ten percent was used
because over the previous three drafts, first round signing
bonuses had increased by an average of ten percent annually.
The fifteenth pick in the 2008 draft received a signing bonus of
242 In the November rankings, Oliver was No. 16 overall (including both high school
and college draft prospects) and No. 8 on the college list. Oliver was ranked No. 8 on the
college list in the September rankings as well. See Jim Callis, Ask BA, BASEBALL AMERICA
(Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/prospects/ask-ba/2008/266992.html.
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$1,730,000, which, adjusted for inflation, would be equivalent to
a signing bonus of $1,903,000 for the 2009 draft. The twentysecond pick in the 2008 draft received a signing bonus of
$1,419,000, which, adjusted for inflation, would be $1,560,900 in
the 2009 draft. The thirty-seventh pick in the 2008 draft
received a signing bonus of $970,000, which, adjusted for
inflation, would be $1,067,000 in the 2009 draft. Therefore, I
estimated Oliver’s lost signing bonus to be in the range of
$342,100 ($1,903,000 minus $1,560,900) and $836,000
($1,903,000 minus $1,067,000).
2. Lost Wages
Because it was unknown whether Oliver would prevail on his
request for injunctive relief to restore his eligibility for the 2009
season, a calculation needed to be made to reflect Oliver’s
damages in the event he only prevailed on the declaratory action
and lost on his claim for injunctive relief, which then would not
have reinstated Oliver’s eligibility. Based upon all of the
evidence that Oliver was considered to be a top draft prospect, I
opined that it was more likely than not that Oliver’s sitting out
from competition during the entire season of his draft-eligible
year would have a substantial detrimental impact on his draft
status that would cause him to slip in the draft beyond the first
round.243 In that event, the available data evidences that Oliver’s
opportunity of reaching the major leagues would become
substantially reduced, such that it would no longer be probable.
Data compiled by Baseball America in 2002 of all players drafted
from 1965 to 1995 shows that a majority—64.9%—of players
drafted in the first round played in the major leagues.244
However, the percentage chances of playing in the major leagues
significantly drops to 41.6% in the second round, 31.1% in the
third round, 23.8% in the fourth round, 23.1% in the fifth round,
15.5% in the sixth through tenth rounds, and 8.6% in the
eleventh through fifteenth rounds.245 Therefore, an estimate of
Oliver’s damages in the event he remained suspended for the

243 Approximately one week after the preparation and filing of my damages report,
the NCAA heard Oklahoma State University’s appeal to have Oliver reinstated. As a
result of that appeal, Oliver's eligibility was restored and his suspension was reduced
from a full season to seventy percent of a season, which would have required him to sit
out forty games of a fifty-six game season. See Aaron Fitt, Headed to Trial: Oliver Case
May Have Lasting Ramifications, BASEBALL AMERICA (Dec. 22, 2008),
http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/college/on-campus/2009/267366.html.
244 Will He Play in the Big Leagues?, BASEBALL AMERICA ONLINE—2002 DRAFT
PREVIEW (compiled by Allan Simpson) (on file with author).
245 Id.
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season had to reflect not only the loss in draft signing bonus246
but also the loss of wages over the course of a major league
career.
If Oliver did not compete during his entire draft-eligible
season, there was a high probability that he would have been
drafted lower than the second round.247 Based upon the statistics
showing that it was no longer probable that Oliver would make it
to the major leagues, an estimate of Oliver’s future lost wages
would approximate his future lost salary income for each year of
lost service time in the major leagues.
For purposes of
determining this amount, a few reasonable assumptions had to
be made: (1) Oliver would have at least average skill as a pitcher
over the course of his career, (2) Oliver would receive at least an
average salary for a pitcher for each year of service time in the
major leagues, and (3) Oliver would serve at least the average
number of years of service time in the major leagues for a
pitcher.
The USA Today Baseball Salaries Database248 contains yearby-year data of salaries for all major league baseball players on
opening day rosters and disabled lists.249 Using the data from
the 2008 season, I calculated the average salary for a pitcher
based upon number of years of service in the major leagues,
which is set forth in the chart below. For the first three years of
246 Adjustments were also made to the estimated range of Oliver’s lost signing bonus
to reflect the difference between the signing bonus he would receive absent any
suspension (that of a fifteenth pick) and the signing bonus he could reasonably expect to
receive if he remained ineligible for the entire 2009 season.
247 See Hall v. Univ. of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104, 106 (D. Minn. 1982). The impact on
a player’s draft stock of not playing for an entire season is evidenced by the fallout of a
lawsuit involving James Paxton, a hard-throwing left-handed college pitcher like Oliver.
Paxton was drafted by the Blue Jays in the supplemental first round as the thirty-seventh
overall pick in the 2009 draft, elected not to sign, and returned to the University of
Kentucky (UK) for his senior year. Based upon a blog post ambiguously suggesting that
an agent acting on Paxton’s behalf may have communicated with the Blue Jays about a
contract, UK insisted that Paxton submit to questioning by the NCAA or face expulsion
from the team. Before the start of the season, Paxton was rated by Baseball America as
the seventh-best college baseball prospect available for the 2010 MLB Draft. Paxton
ended up leaving UK and playing for an independent league team where he had limited
playing time in which to showcase his talents in time for the 2010 draft. As a result,
Paxton ended up slipping to the fourth round in the June 2010 draft. See Patrick Sullivan,
Paxton Gives Up Fight, Leaves UK, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Feb. 27, 2010, 8:07 AM),
http://www.kentucky.com/2010/02/27/1159206/pitcher-who-sued-uk-leaves-team.html;
Baseball America Names Paxton a Top Pro Prospect, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Feb.
27, 2010, 8:07 AM), http://www.kentucky.com/2009/09/18/940423/baseball-america-namespaxton.html.
248 USA TODAY SALARIES DATABASE, http://content.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/
salaries/defalt.aspx (last visited June 20, 2010).
249 Id. (“Figures, compiled by USA TODAY, are based on documents obtained from the
MLB Players Association, club officials and filed with Major League Baseball’s central
office. Deferred payments and incentive clauses are not included. Team payrolls do not
include money paid or received in trades or for players who have been released.”).
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service, I omitted players signed from Japan, as many of them
have signed multi-million dollar major league contracts far
beyond the wages paid pursuant to the league’s minimum salary
rules that bind players during their first three seasons under
what is known as the “reserve system.”250
Years of Number of Average
Service
Pitchers
Salary
1
91
$429,260
2
79
$467,927
3
49
$581,175
4
37
$1,810,698
5
31
$2,683,387
6
23
$4,694,420
7
21
$5,531,547
8
22
$6,906,479
9
14
$4,253,452
10
17
$6,873,529
11
10
$7,240,617
12
4
$8,000,000
13
9
$5,385,022
14
4
$8,901,781
15
3
$7,604,450
16
3
$8,925,061
17
2
$5,835,514
18
2
$4,500,000
19
1
$8,000,000
20
3
$9,533,515
21
3
$10,666,667
Research shows that the average number of years of total
service time for a major league player is 5.6 years.251 In
accordance with the assumption that Oliver would serve the
average number of years in the major leagues for a pitcher, an
amount representing his future lost wages would be the sum
total of the average annual salaries for a major league pitcher for
the first five years of service time.
Further, I made an
250 For an excellent summary of the rules pertaining to Major League Baseball’s
reserve system, salary arbitration system, and free agency system, see Abrams, supra
note 14, at 205–09.
251 Sam Roberts, Just How Long Does the Average Baseball Career Last?, N.Y. TIMES,
(July 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/sports/baseball/15careers.html. See
Abrams, supra note 14, at 216 (finding the mean career of a pitcher on a Major League
Roster to be seven years and 124 days, based on all pitchers who ended their Major
League careers after 2002 season who had at least ten starts in one Major League
season).
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assumption that the plaintiff would spend three years in the
minor leagues and thus would not have started his major league
career until four years later (in the year 2012). Therefore,
Oliver’s future lost wages would be the total of the annual
salaries he would receive in each of years 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015,
and 2016.
Research also showed that major league salaries had
increased each year for the previous four years, and the average
increase over the previous four seasons was 5.75% annually.252
Using the 2008 average salary figures in the chart above and
compounding those figures at an annual rate of 5.75% to account
for inflation, I estimated Oliver’s salary for his first five years of
major league service to be as follows:
Year
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Service Time
1 year
2 years
3 years
4 years
5 years

Salary
$536,836
$618,842
$812,810
$2,677,988
$4,196,877

The total future lost wages were then reduced to present
value based upon a conservative low-risk investment rate of
return. As of December 5, 2008, the five-year U.S. government
bond yield was 1.67%.253 The future lost wages, reduced to
present value based upon a 1.69% yield and compounded each
year, was as follows:
Year
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Salary
$501,455
$568,287
$733,795
$2,376,799
$3,661,911

252 2008 salaries increased from the previous year by 3.6%; 2007 salaries increased
from the previous year by 4.6%; 2006 salaries increased from the previous year by 8.9%;
and 2005 salaries increased from the previous year by 5.9%. While I briefly mention the
calculations made in the Oliver case to adjust his future earnings for inflation and present
value, an in-depth discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this Article.
253 Historical Five Year Bond Data, FED. RES., http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/h15/data/Business_day/H15_TCMNOM_Y5.txt (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
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Therefore, I estimated Oliver’s total future lost wages,
increased for inflation and reduced to present value, at
$7,842,247.
A fair criticism of this estimate of future lost major league
wages would be that it assumes a player with more than a fifty
percent chance of making the major leagues (those drafted in the
first round) will make the major leagues and a player with less
than a fifty percent chance (those drafted in the second round or
lower) will not. This estimate also awards the full amount of the
estimated future lost wages and thus does not accurately reflect
the extent to which the suspension caused a reduction in Oliver’s
chances of making the major leagues. In some respects, this
resembles the “all or nothing” rule.254 My estimation of Oliver’s
lost future wages, from a causation standpoint, is the result of a
straight application of the traditional but for test. In other
words, but for the wrongful suspension, Oliver would not have
lost the chance at a major league career, which seems to be the
standard that was utilized in Felder.255
However, a more precise application of loss of chance
principles would calculate Oliver’s lost future wages to reflect the
reduced chance of making the major leagues that resulted from
the suspension.
As discussed in this Article, assessing
diminished chance in terms of a percentage with any degree of
precision is usually extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do.
But here, the available data particularly lends itself to a
reasonable approximation of a loss of chance percentage using a
proportional damages method as follows:256
(1) Calculate the total wages Oliver could reasonably have
expected to earn before the suspension, which equals the
total future lost wages, increased for inflation and reduced to
present value, of $7,842,247 (as determined above).
(2) Calculate the reduced chance percentage. Before the
suspension, Oliver’s percentage chance of making the
average major league salary was 64.9% (as a projected first
round pick).257 After the suspension, based upon an estimate
of being drafted lower than the first round, his percentage
254 For a discussion of how the lost chance doctrine alleviates the perceived
unfairness of the all or nothing rule of tort recovery, which provides that the plaintiff may
only recover if she can prove that the defendant’s conduct more likely than not caused the
unfavorable outcome, see supra Part II.A.1. If the plaintiff meets this burden she
recovers one hundred percent of her damages, and if she does not meet this burden she
recovers nothing.
255 For a discussion of the but for test, see supra Part II.A.2.
256 See supra Part II.B.1.
257 See supra Part IV.B.2.
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chance of making the average major league salary dropped
to anywhere from 41.6% to 8.6% depending upon the
round.258 The difference results in a diminished chance in
the range of 23.3% to 56.3%.
(3) Multiply the amount determined in step one by the
reduced chance percentage determined in step two, which
equals a range of $1,827,243 to $4,415,185.259
C. The Settlement Entered After the Draft
On February 12, 2009, the trial court granted Oliver’s
request for declaratory and injunctive relief, invalidating the no
agent rule and immediately restoring Oliver’s eligibility for the
2009 season.260 The judge thereafter scheduled a trial to
determine damages for mid-October, four months after the 2009
June draft.
Oliver was drafted in the second round with the fifty-eighth
pick by the Detroit Tigers.261 While it is very typical for top
college draft prospects to progressively improve their
performance each year in college, Oliver’s performance in 2009
was much worse than in 2007 and 2008. In 2009, Oliver posted a
5-6 record with a 5.30 ERA and opponents batted .274 against
him.262 A worse performance during the season of any player’s
draft-eligible year than in previous years can cause a player to be
drafted lower than he otherwise would have been drafted, and
how much lower would depend upon the extent of the worse
performance.
A player’s statistics can influence a scout’s
evaluation of a player’s potential to play in the major leagues.263
See supra Part IV.B.2.
An alternative calculation in step three would be to determine a range for each
year separately (for 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016) by multiplying the diminished
chance percentage range by the average salary for each year, because the average salary
for each year was increased for inflation and reduced to present value on a compounded
basis.
260 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The NCAA filed a motion in limine
before trial to exclude my testimony on the grounds that it did not meet the admissibility
standard under Rule 702 and further on the basis that I was not qualified as an expert.
See Defendant National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Motion in Limine to Exclude
Purported Expert Testimony, Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas
2008) (No. 2008-CV-0762). The trial court denied the motion, noting that “the
admissibility of expert testimony must be made on a case-by-case basis, reviewing the
expert’s knowledge, skill, experience, training and education” and “the determination of
whether a witness possesses the qualifications necessary to give expert testimony and
introduce evidence also lies within the sound discretion of this Court.” Judgment Entry,
Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 2009) (No. 2008-CV-0762).
261 See Andrew Oliver Pitching Statistics, supra note 235.
262 Id.
263 See Alan Schwarz, The Great Debate, BASEBALL AMERICA (Jan. 7, 2005),
http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/features/050107debate.html. In a 2005 interview
conducted by Baseball America, two longtime scouts and two baseball statistics experts
258
259
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Oliver’s uncharacteristically poor performance could explain why
he was drafted much lower than projected at the start of the
season, and even lower than the lowest pick I estimated he would
have been drafted taking into account the reduced intangibles
value (the thirty-seventh slot).
Thus, Oliver’s reduced
intangibles value, combined with a worse than expected
performance during his draft-eligible season, caused him to drop
from a projected middle of the first round pick at the start of the
season to the fifty-eighth pick in the 2009 draft.
Oliver signed with the Tigers and received a $1,495,000
signing bonus.264 Oliver and the NCAA reached a settlement one
week before the scheduled damages trial, whereby Oliver was
paid $750,000 and the trial court’s order invalidating the no
agent rule was vacated.265 Thus, we will never know whether a
jury would have decided that the NCAA’s wrongful suspension in
fact caused Oliver a diminished chance of being drafted higher or
what value the jury would have placed on that loss of chance.
Nevertheless, it provides a unique case study for discussing the
computation of lost earning capacity damages of an amateur
player fairly high on the EPR. In the end, Oliver’s gross
compensation equaled what he would have received had he been
drafted as originally projected because his signing bonus and
settlement amount, combined, equates roughly to the signing
bonus a player drafted in the middle of the first round can
reasonably expect to receive. Oliver was called up by the Tigers
and had his first start in the major leagues just one year after
being drafted, which, if nothing else, proves that all the scouting
reports on him were accurate.
CONCLUSION
Athletes claiming damages for lost earning capacity in a
professional sports career have a steep burden to overcome—
which I have delineated in this Article as a two-step burden.
Demonstrating that they possess substantial prospects as a
professional athlete in the court room as opposed to on the court
is a whole different ball game. Claims for lost future earnings in
discussed the value of player statistics to scouts in evaluating players. Id. According to
Gary Hughes, the Cubs’ assistant general manager and a scout for more than thirty years
with many clubs, “[y]ou show up at a game and the first thing you get is a stat sheet and
you look at it.” Id. Eddie Bane, the Angels’ scouting director and a former top pitching
prospect himself, agrees: “I’m going to pick up the stat sheet—I’m going to look at the
strikeouts and walks. I’m going to look at the batting average. I’m going to know all that
stuff because I’ve been on the computer.” Id.
264 See Andrew Oliver Pitching Statistics, supra note 235.
265 See Associated Press, Oliver Receives $750,000 Settlement, ESPN.COM (Oct. 8,
2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=4543864.
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a professional sports career involve making predictions about a
future career that only a small fraction of the population is able
to attain. However, the athlete need not prove that he would
attain it, but only that he once had the chance to attain it and
that chance was either lost or reduced. Courts have struggled
with articulating any definitive standard for determining when
the defendant’s actions in fact caused a loss, but their holdings
seem to suggest an application of the traditional but for analysis.
As discussed in this Article, the athlete’s claim can be viewed
with more precision within the constructs of the loss of chance
doctrine, assessing the athlete’s chances before and after the
breach, which can also accomplish a more fair and adequate
allocation of fault in proportion to the extent of the harm.
Determining the amount of lost future earnings, by
definition, is “speculative” and simply cannot be proven with
complete certainty. Recognizing this, the law imposes a lesser,
but nebulous, standard of “reasonable certainty.” As the cases
referenced in this Article demonstrate, it is an extremely factintensive inquiry whereby the devil is in the details: the
reliability of the evidence, the knowledge of the experts, the
methodology, procedures, and calculations used by the experts,
and the data compilations upon which they are based. In some
cases, the athlete may be so high on the earning potential range
(EPR) with an established earnings history that it can be
relatively easy to meet both burdens or, conversely, the athlete
may be so low on the EPR that doing so is nearly impossible.
While a future earnings assessment of an athlete in a
professional sports career is, in many respects, akin to an
appraisal process, and thus the use of player comparables is a
viable methodology in some cases, the Oliver case demonstrates
the complexities inherent in calculating lost future earnings for
top draft prospect amateur athletes who are shown to be fairly
high on the EPR.

